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“Law students should be dispensed from the accomplishment of antiquarian 
exercises in and about the theory of consideration.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
A contract, every first-year law student learns, is a promise that will be en-
forced in a court of law.2 How do we distinguish the casual social promise,3 or 
the promise made in jest4, from those behind which we should throw the awe-
some power of the state? Simple, the law professor responds, we look for “con-
sideration.” To be legally enforceable, a promise must be given in return for a 
reciprocal promise or performance. The bargained-for exchange is the touch-
stone of consideration, and therefore of contract. Elaboration of this concept 
requires sorting out subtle distinctions, for example, between a true exchange 
and a gift with strings attached.5 What, for example, is the difference between 
 
*  Professor, CUNY School of Law. My thanks to Mudassar Topa for excellent research as-
sistance, to the participants at the KCON9 annual conference on contract law, and to Jeremy 
Telman and Deborah Zalesne for helpful comments and conversations (which in no way im-
ply endorsement of the views expressed here). 
1  GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974). 
2  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
3  Stood Up for Prom, She Files a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1989, at A12. 
4  Compare Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), with Lucy v. 
Zehmer, 84 S.E. 2d 516, 518 (Va. Ct. App. 1954). 
5  Compare Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & Casino, 109 F. Supp. 2d 324, 330 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(holding that plaintiff’s traveling to casino was consideration for casino’s promise of a 
prize), with Tomczak v. Koochiching Cty. Highway Dep’t, No. C4-98-991, 1999 WL 55501, 
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Mr. Story’s legally enforceable promise to his nephew6 and Mrs. Salt’s legally 
unenforceable promise to her nephew?7 
Once this is accomplished, students will then learn various exceptions: the 
half-dozen or more categories of promises where the bargained-for exchange 
seems absent, but that will nevertheless be legally enforceable, perhaps because 
of reasonable reliance by the promisee,8 the promisor’s moral obligation,9 or 
various other reasons.10 The result is several weeks of confusion and needless 
study of musty old cases. Worse, generations of present and future lawyers and 
judges continue to infect the practice of contract law with the same confusion. 
It is not my aim to re-engage the scholarly debate concerning competing 
theories of contract.11 Instead, my approach is pragmatic. Consideration doc-
trine is riddled with exceptions, is largely unhelpful or even counterproductive 
in deciding contract disputes and has lost its explanatory power. The time has 
come to abandon this fruitless pedagogical exercise once and for all. We should 
stop teaching consideration as an element of contract law to new generations of 
law students. 
This article will present a survey of contemporary case law to demonstrate 
the incoherence of, and in some contexts the harm being done by, consideration 
doctrine, and to propose a consideration-free contracts syllabus to free us from 
this chore. A brief review of the theoretical landscape is followed by a review 
of the problems that consideration and its corollaries purport to solve, the dif-
ferent possible rules for each problem and the present state of the law, and a 
comprehensive survey of recent court decisions applying and misapplying con-
sideration doctrine and its corollaries. Finally, I propose a consideration-free 
syllabus for teaching contracts law. 
I. CONSIDERATION: THE FAILED UNIFIED THEORY OF CONTRACT 
More than fifty years ago, Grant Gilmore pronounced the death of classical 
theory of contract centered on consideration as its unified theory.12 He pointed 
to the growing importance of reliance, restitution, and other competing theories 
of promise enforcement, as fundamentally undermining consideration as the 
 
at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1999) (holding that homeowner’s release of claims and prom-
ise to maintain town equipment was not consideration for town’s promise to lend the equip-
ment), and SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 112 (3d ed. 1957), and see infra text accompanying notes 88–109 (the discus-
sion of mortgage modification cases). 
6  Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 258–59 (N.Y. 1891). 
7  Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94–95 (N.Y. 1919). 
8  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
9  Id. § 86 cmt. a. 
10  Id. §§ 82–88. 
11  See Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915, 
917 (2012). 
12  GILMORE, supra note 1, at 3. 
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cornerstone of contract.13 Other scholars following Professor Gilmore have tak-
en up the cause. Professor Mark Wessman, for example, argued for abandoning 
consideration doctrine convincingly in three articles in 1993,14 1996,15 and 
2008.16 The search for a unified theory of contract founded on consideration 
has been discredited by a number of other scholars.17 The better view is that 
there is no single unifying theory of contract enforcement, and that pluralistic 
values necessarily inform court decisions on whether to enforce promises.18 
Some, like Professor Randy Barnett, have disputed the idea that reliance, rather 
than commercial exchange, is or ought to be, a basis of contract enforcement.19 
On the other hand, Professor Charles Knapp surveyed the territory in 1998, and 
concluded that reliance retains an important, if not exclusive, role in identifying 
promises the law may enforce.20 The Second Restatement implicitly acknowl-
edges the contradiction: a contract requires assent and consideration;21 howev-
er, whether or not there is a bargain, a contract may be formed under the special 
rules in sections 82–94, under the heading “Contracts without Consideration.”22 
Consideration doctrine, as Professor Gilmore pointed out, did not evolve 
organically from the common law. Professors Christopher Columbus Langdell 
and Samuel Williston and Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes invented it.23 The edi-
fice that law professors erected can and ought to be dismantled when its failure 
has become evident. More than forty years have passed since Professor Gil-
more announced the death of classical Holmesian consideration. The central 
argument in The Death of Contract (that every rule and corollary of considera-
tion doctrine coexists with one or more contrary rules) has lost none of its vital-
ity.24 Still, first-year law students waste precious class time and brainpower 
parsing this obscurantism. Consideration remains a tedious centerpiece of the 
 
13  Id. at 70–85. 
14  Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the Doctrine of 
Consideration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45, 117 (1993) [hereinafter Wessman, Should We Fire 
the Gatekeeper?]. 
15  Mark B. Wessman, Retaining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of 
Consideration, 29 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 713, 845 (1996). 
16  Mark B. Wessman, Recent Defenses of Consideration: Commodification and Collabora-
tion, 41 IND. L. REV. 9, 10, 53 (2008). 
17  BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 161–62 (2012); Eyal Za-
mir, Contract Law and Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2077, 2119 
(2014). 
18  Kreitner, supra note 11, at 917, 921; Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, Plural Values in 
Contract Law: Theory and Implementation, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571, 573, 576 
(2019) (citing competing values of efficiency, autonomy, equality and community); Nathan 
Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1485 (2005). 
19  Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 518, 527 (1996). 
20  Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1191, 1331–32 (1998). 
21  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
22  Id. § 17(2). 
23  GILMORE, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
24  Id. at 33. 
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law school curriculum. Every year students are taught first that the bargained-
for exchange is the sine qua non for legal enforcement of promises, and then 
taught a series of completely inconsistent rules, often in a confusing stew of 
common law rule, Restatement (First or Second) rule, U.C.C. rule, majority 
rule, and minority rule. 
The consideration rules are unnecessary and occasionally harmful. They 
are unnecessary when sounder contract principles explain and justify the same 
results, and even more so when they are ritualistically incanted in cases not 
raising consideration issues at all. They are harmful when they produce unfair 
and unsound results, or when courts and lawyers simply misunderstand them so 
that they interfere with just and equitable resolution of disputes. As future law-
yers and judges, law students should not be confused and biased by learning 
abstruse consideration rules riddled with exceptions and contradictions. The 
libertarian strain of consideration doctrine, which resists evaluating the fairness 
of bargains, subtly gives primacy to one among the many plural and competing 
values at the heart of contract disputes. Consideration doctrine, and the courts’ 
dogged refusal to abandon it, causes confusion, undermines good contract anal-
ysis, and subverts the values that should drive the resolution of contract dis-
putes. 
Especially troublesome, and arguably indefensible, are the set of corollar-
ies consideration doctrine has spawned.25 Judges continue applying the consid-
eration corollaries to the discrete problems where it does more harm than 
good.26 Promises in return for past services or benefits, reaffirmation of dis-
charged promises, contract modifications, illusory promises, third-party guaran-
tees, and binding firm offers are contract problems better dealt with on their 
own terms, rather than by continuing to invoke the confusing and unhelpful 
language of consideration. For most of these problems the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, adopted in 1981, proposed to abandon consideration or to 
establish new rules to deal with the unique values and issues that each discrete 
problem poses. Many courts have been reluctant to accept the Second Restate-
ment’s invitations, perhaps because of the indoctrination in consideration that 
judges received in their law school contracts class.27 
II. THE CORE AND THE COROLLARIES—TACKLING THE ISSUES 
The consideration doctrine at its core is about the issue of gift promises, 
that is, promises not part of a bargained-for exchange, but consideration has al-
 
25  Knapp, supra note 20, at 1195; Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper?, supra note 
14, at 49. 
26  See infra notes 244–67 and accompanying text. 
27  See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 20, at 1192–93; infra notes 36, 58–59, 120–28, 140–41 and 
accompanying text. 
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so spawned a set of corollaries about a variety of distinct contract problems.28 
Each of the corollaries has been, or ought to be, replaced by modern rules more 
appropriate to the problem at hand. The corollaries include (1) the pre-existing 
duty rule making some post-contract modifications unenforceable; (2) the re-
quirement of payment to enforce binding offers as options; (3) the non-
enforceability of promises recognizing past services, moral obligations or dis-
charged debts; (4) the illusory promise doctrine negating contracts that give one 
party unrestricted discretion in how to perform, or discretion to cancel or modi-
fy promises; and (5) difficulties in enforcing third-party guarantees. For the 
core issue of gift promises, and for each of the corollaries, consideration doc-
trine does a poor job of advancing the competing values at stake, and for each 
problem, better doctrinal solutions exist. 
A. The Non-Exchange Economy—Charitable Subscriptions, Free Services, 
and Gift Promises 
1. The Problem and the Values at Stake 
The non-profit economy is huge.29 Tax-exempt public charities in the Unit-
ed States have assets of more than $3 trillion, and spend $1.6 trillion each 
year.30 Charities of all types rely not only on present gifts from donors but also 
on promises of future and structured gifts to plan their activities.31 A wide vari-
ety of nonprofit service providers, including free legal aid and health care pro-
viders, make promises and commitments on which their clients rely.32 When a 
donor (or donor’s estate) reneges on a charitable pledge, or a free service pro-
vider dishonors promises to its clients, real and recognizable harm results.33 In 
family and business relationships, promises inducing expectations and reliance 
may not be based on a bargained-for exchange.34 Whether and when society 
and the state should step in to enforce non-exchange promises is the first prob-
lem that consideration doctrine fails to solve. 
 
28  See Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 935 
(1958); B.J. Reiter, Courts, Consideration, and Common Sense, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 439, 
441 (1977). 
29  Burton A. Weisbrod, The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private En-
terprise and Government, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 541, 541–42 (1997). 
30  BRICE S. MCKEEVER, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF 2015: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, 
AND VOLUNTEERING 1 (2015). 
31  See RONALD R. JORDAN & KATELYN L. QUYNN, PLANNED GIVING: A GUIDE TO 
FUNDRAISING AND PHILANTHROPY 6–7(4th ed. 2009). 
32  E.g., Lawrence v. Ingham Cty. Health Dep’t Family Planning/Pre-Natal Clinic, 408 
N.W.2d 461, 463 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
33  Maryland Nat’l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed’n of Greater Wash., Inc., 407 A.2d 
1130, 1138 (Md. Ct. App. 1979) (denying enforcement of charitable pledge); Lawrence, 408 
N.W.2d at 462; Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176–77 (N.Y. 
1927) (enforcing charitable pledge). 
34  E.g., Conrad v. Fields, No. A06-1387, 2007 WL 2106302, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 24, 
2007). 
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Arguments cited for not enforcing gift promises include the possibility of 
fabrication, the greater risk of nondeliberative or improvident promises, the dif-
ficulty of determining the promise maker’s seriousness of intention, the possi-
bility that the promise maker’s circumstances will change making enforcement 
unfair or oppressive, and the possibility that legal enforcement would discour-
age some promises from being made.35 There is also the argument that gift 
promises are made in the shadow of the law, so that a donee’s reliance on a 
non-exchange promise cannot be viewed as reasonable, or at least that the rea-
sonableness of reliance, and the foreseeability of legal enforcement, is hope-
lessly indeterminate.36 
On the other hand, many legal scholars have argued that many or all gift 
promises ought to be legally enforced.37 Gift promises may reduce economic 
inequality by encouraging transfers from the wealthy to the indigent. Even re-
quiring proof of reliance to enforce gift promises reinforces the economic pow-
er of donors, who are generally wealthy, over donees, who tend to be less so.38 
Feminists and other scholars have highlighted the important role of household 
and caretaking work as well as other intra-family commitments to the function-
ing of the economy and broader society.39 Ascribing legal power to market-
based exchanges over other promissory commitments leaves out, in gendered 
ways, equally important spheres of vital economic activity.40 The problem for 
law students and courts is to evaluate the possible rules in light of these com-
peting arguments and values. 
2. Choice of Rules 
Consideration doctrine is one of several possible rules to distinguish gift 
promises that should be legally enforceable from those that should not. The 
 
35  William A. Drennan, Charitable Pledges: Contracts of Confusion, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 
477, 484 (2015); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 821, 823 (1997); George S. Geis, Gift Promises and the Edge of Contract Law, 
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 663, 684 (2014). 
36  See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 275 (1986) 
[hereinafter Barnett, A Consent Theory] (critiquing promissory estoppel and reliance theory 
because only “reasonable” or justifiable reliance is rewarded with enforcement, begging the 
question of which promises are sufficiently reliable to result in legal enforcement). 
37  See Geis, supra note 35, at 688; Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 39, 40 (1992); Robert A. Prentice, “Law &” Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 881, 937 (2007); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred 
Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 419–20 (1991); Sabine Tsuruda, Contract, Power, and the 
Value of Donative Promises, 69 S.C. L. REV 479, 482 (2017). 
38  Tsuruda, supra note 37, at 481–82. 
39  See BEYOND THE MARKETPLACE: RETHINKING ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 13–14 (Roger 
Friedland & A.F. Robinson eds., 1990). 
40  See Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1251–52 
(1999); Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping Fami-
ly Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2015) (arguing that commit-
ments of unmarried partners should be contractually enforceable). 
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competing possibilities include: (1) require that the donor receive something in 
exchange (consideration), (2) require the donee to demonstrate substantial and 
reasonable reliance on the promise, (3) require a writing or other formality to 
make a promise enforceable, or (4) simply make all gift promises legally en-
forceable unless the donor has a standard contract law defense, such as incapac-
ity, unconscionability, or impracticability.41 The consideration rule is that a do-
nor’s promise, albeit formal, in writing, witnessed and sealed, is unenforceable 
if the donor dies or changes her mind, when the donee or charitable institution 
has not provided or promised goods or services of some sort in return.42 Con-
sideration doctrine would also make the nonprofit hospital’s or legal aid of-
fice’s promises of free services to its clients unenforceable in most cases.43 
The second alternative rule has come to be known as promissory estoppel. 
Restatement (Second) section 90 makes promises enforceable when there is a 
clear promise made, the promisee has reasonably and foreseeably relied on the 
promise, and justice requires enforcement.44 Pennsylvania is apparently the on-
ly state to have adopted the third option, namely to grant legal enforcement to 
all donative promises made in a formal signed writing.45 Restatement (Second) 
section 90(2) adopts the fourth option for charitable pledges, making them en-
forceable without any additional showing of exchange or reliance.46 
The three alternatives to consideration (reliance, the signed writing, and 
unrestricted enforcement) can each be adapted to address some of the concerns 
motivating the consideration rule. For example, the concern that gift promises 
are too easily fabricated is allayed either by requiring a formal writing, or some 
heightened standard of proof (including but not limited to evidence of reasona-
ble reliance) that the donor intends to be legally bound.47 Donors who make 
rash promises or whose circumstances change may invoke contract law defens-
es including undue influence, mistake and impracticability.48 The fourth ele-
ment of promissory estoppel, that “injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment,” also gives courts latitude to deny enforcement of gift promises when the 
values counseling against enforcement come into play.49 
 
41  See Geis, supra note 35, at 668–72; Kull, supra note 37, at 64–65; Shavell, supra note 37, 
at 419–20; Tsuruda, supra note 37, at 482–84. 
42  Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 821–22. 
43  See Lawrence v. Ingham Cty. Health Dep’t Family Planning/Pre-Natal Clinic, 408 
N.W.2d 461, 463–64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (dismissing breach of contract claims by patient 
against free health clinic based on absence of consideration). 
44  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
45  33 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6 (West 2019); see also Geis, supra note 35, at 
672. 
46  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
47  Drennan, supra note 35, at 519. 
48  See, e.g., Love v. Love, 182 B.R. 161, 171 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1995) (gift set aside based 
on undue influence). 
49  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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3. The State of the Law 
The exceptions to the consideration rule have led observers to conclude 
that a charitable pledge is more likely than not to be enforced in U.S. courts.50 
Most state courts are able to discern either a bargained-for exchange51 or some 
form of reliance by the charity, such as committing to large expenditures, to en-
force the pledge, while a few states justify enforcement as a matter of public 
policy to encourage charitable pledges, regardless of reliance.52 A promise of a 
future gift of any category may be found legally enforceable because of reason-
able and foreseeable reliance,53 or if it is made in recognition of some past ben-
efit conferred by the donee on the donor,54 or in some states, so long as it is 
made in writing with or without a seal,55 or was made using an irrevocable trust 
or other commitment devices.56 
On the other hand, the blanket enforceability rule advocated by Restate-
ment (Second) section 90(2) making all charitable pledges enforceable regard-
less of reliance or formality has been explicitly adopted in only one state (Io-
wa).57 An honest appraisal of the state of the law regarding charitable pledges is 
that most courts will look for either the bargained-for exchange or reliance by 
the charity in planning projects, using the pledge to solicit others, or offering 
naming rights or other intangible benefits to the donor.58 On this particular 
problem, the Restatement (Second)’s proposed solution, to simply make chari-
table pledges enforceable subject to ordinary contract defenses, remains an as-
piration. 
As for gift promises generally, state courts have universally adopted prom-
issory estoppel as an alternative to the bargained-for exchange.59 The West 
classification system still treats “promissory estoppel” or “detrimental reliance” 
as an equitable rule wholly outside of contracts doctrine.60 During the three 
 
50  Mary Frances Budig et al., Pledges to Nonprofit Organizations: Are They Enforceable 
and Must They Be Enforced?, 27 U. S.F. L. REV. 47, 50 (1992). 
51  See Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l. Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1927). 
52  E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises and Paternalism, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 404 n.105 
(2000). 
53  Charles Calleros, Cause, Consideration, Promissory Estoppel, and Promises Under 
Deed: What Our Students Should Know About Enforcement of Promises in a Historical and 
International Context, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 108 (2013). 
54  See infra Sections II.D.1–3. 
55  The Uniform Written Obligations Act, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 206, 206 (1929). 
56  Geis, supra note 35, at 673. 
57  CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 234–35 
(6th ed. 2007). 
58  E.g., Maryland Nat’l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed’n of Greater Wash., Inc., 407 
A.2d 1130, 1137 (Md. Ct. App. 1979); see also Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 36, at 
275. 
59  Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45, 
47–48 (1996); see also Knapp, supra note 20, at 1192 (surveying scholarly debate as to 
whether case law based on promissory estoppel is truly founded on the reliance interest). 
60  West Estoppel Key number 85 Future Events; Promissory Estoppel, WESTLAW, https:// 
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years between July 2015 and June 2018, there were 127 federal and state court 
case headings identified by West as promissory estoppel cases from thirty-five 
states and the District of Columbia, all approving (or at least not rejecting) the 
rule.61 In thirty-five of those cases, courts enforced a promise based on reason-
able reliance.62 Courts have enforced non-exchange promises made by land-
owners,63 a father’s promise to pay his daughter’s private college tuition,64 
promises by mortgagees to modify loan repayment terms,65 and promises made 
during the negotiation of commercial contracts.66 Thus, rather than being a de-
viation from the core of contract doctrine, promissory estoppel, with its ele-
ments of foreseeable reliance and the needs of justice, has come into its own as 
an alternative test for whether promises should be legally enforced. 
The classic gratuitous family promise, on which contracts casebooks and 
first-year students spend so much time, is litigated rarely. Among the cases 
comprising a three-year case review of consideration keynotes,67 there was only 
one case that clearly fits this paradigm, a case where a court rejected a son’s 
allegation of a promise to inherit the family ranch because the promise was too 
indefinite to enforce, either as contract or based on promissory estoppel.68 The 
rules of promissory estoppel were quite adequate to resolve this family dispute, 
so even in this most paradigmatic case, consideration doctrine was of little use. 
In short, a description of contemporary contract law’s approach to the donative 
promise should begin with promissory estoppel and reliance, while also men-
tioning the options of enforcing all written charitable promises or even all char-
itable promises. The ill-fitting bargain theory of consideration doctrine deserves 
little more than passing historical mention. 
 
1.next.westlaw.com [https://perma.cc/KUV9-25PU] (follow “Key Numbers” hyperlink; then 
follow “Estoppel” hyperlink and select key number 85). 
61  See Appendix II, on file with author (a spreadsheet with the complete list and classifica-
tion of these 127 cases). 
62  See id. (cases coded as promise enforced). 
63  Zwart v. Penning, 912 N.W.2d 833, 839 (S.D. 2018); Hayes v. Mountain View Estates 
Homeowners Ass’n, 188 A.3d 678, 690 (Vt. 2018). 
64  Manfrede v. Harris, 80 N.Y.S.3d 138, 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (enforcing father’s 
promise to pay daughter’s private college tuition based on reliance). 
65  Ryan-Beedy v. Bank of New York Mellon, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2018); 
Traut v. Quantum Servicing Corp., 299 F. Supp. 3d 235, 240 (D. Mass. 2018); Zhong v. 
PNC Bank, N.A., 812 S.E.2d 514, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). 
66  Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 3d 691, 717 (N.D. Ill. 
2017). 
67  See infra Part III. 
68  Willey v. Willey, 385 P.3d 290, 302 (Wyo. 2016). 
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B. The Post-Contract Modification 
1. The Problem and the Values at Stake 
The first consideration corollary, the pre-existing duty rule, holds that a 
mutual agreement to amend contract duties is not supported by consideration, 
and therefore unenforceable, when only one party receives additional benefits 
or is relieved of some obligations.69 This rule may have arisen from courts’ in-
tuition that no contract party would agree to accept less than originally bar-
gained for, or to pay or perform more, without a quid pro quo, unless the other 
party had gained unfair power in the transaction.70 On the other hand, the au-
tonomy values behind a consent theory of contract would counsel that modifi-
cations ought to be enforced so long as they are truly voluntary, and that courts 
ought to address issues of unfair power directly, for example using the doctrine 
of economic duress.71 
Consideration doctrine is not especially helpful in resolving post-contract 
modification issues. Just as parties may dispute the formation of a contract, 
they may dispute the existence or validity of a later agreement to modify the 
original contract. Assuming the proponent of the modification can prove mutu-
al assent to a change in terms, the issue becomes whether the courts should en-
force the modified terms or the original contract terms. Because legal remedies 
for breach may be insufficient and untimely, some one-sided contract modifica-
tions may be the result of the “hold-up game,” that is, one party’s threat to 
breach unless the other party agrees to increased payment or performance.72 
The contract modification problem becomes an enforceability problem, raising 
questions of duress and unequal bargaining power, and of the substantive fair-
ness of the modified terms. 
Many critics have pointed out that consideration is an unsatisfactory test 
for whether mutually agreed modifications should be enforced.73 The pre-
 
69  JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 4.9 (6th ed. 2009). 
70  Varouj A. Aivazian et al., The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a 
Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 173, 174 (1984). 
71  Id.; Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the Preexisting Duty Rule and its Per-
sistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 429 (1996); cf. Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral 
Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 233–34 
(1997) (arguing that contract autonomy should include enforcement of agreements not to 
modify contracts as economically efficient). 
72  Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of 
Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 338 
(1993). 
73  See, e.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.22 n.3 (3d ed. 
2004) (listing law review articles and case law questioning the rule); 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & 
HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 7.1 (rev. ed. 1995) (“The pre-
existing duty rule is undergoing a slow erosion and, as a general rule, is destined to be over-
turned.”); Reiter, supra note 28, at 439–41; Corneill A. Stephens, Abandoning the Pre-
Existing Duty Rule: Eliminating the Unnecessary, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 355, 389 (2008) 
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existing duty rule can be both over- and underinclusive.74 A modification that is 
fully voluntary, and does not reflect any abuse of bargaining power, may still 
be denied enforcement because only one party’s rights or obligations change.75 
Conversely, a modification that is the product of economic duress may be en-
forced under the consideration rule, so long as some minimum changes are 
made to both parties’ duties.76 
The common law draws a clear line between parties’ duties before and af-
ter making a contract. Pre-contract, parties bargain at “arm’s length,” each con-
cerned only with their own self-interest, and therefore owing no duty to bargain 
in good faith or any other duty, other than not to engage in fraud. After making 
a contract, each party owes the other party “a duty of good faith.”77 That duty is 
often described as including the duty not to deprive the other party of the ex-
pected benefit of the bargain.78 When unanticipated problems arise, it is entire-
ly consistent with good faith that parties may renegotiate their mutual obliga-
tions, or the obligations of only one party.79 Conversely, both parties should 
refrain from exploiting the other party’s vulnerability that results from the con-
tract itself, in other words, the difficulty of obtaining a substitute counterparty 
when projects are underway, to extract favorable changes or concessions in 
contract promises.80 Thus, the real issues in evaluating contract modifications 
revolve around good faith and economic duress, and not whether there is a new 
bargained-for exchange. Nevertheless, courts have adhered stubbornly to the 
consideration requirement for post-contract modifications, sometimes with re-
grettable results.81 
Consideration analysis can lead to unjust results in some applications to at-
will employment contracts. Courts often struggle with the problem that in a true 
at-will employment contract, either party may cease performance at any time, 
subject only to the employer’s duty to pay for work previously performed.82 As 
a result, an employer’s promise of additional compensation or benefits after 
 
(labeling preexisting-duty rule as unnecessary in view of modern contract doctrines such as 
duress). 
74  Johnston, supra note 72, at 375. 
75  E.g., Barrett-O’Neill v. Lalo, LLC, 171 F. Supp. 3d 725, 744 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (denying 
enforcement of modification agreed at the request of elderly consumer, but also finding the 
merchant’s performance unconscionable under state consumer protection law). 
76  See Stephens, supra note 73, at 364. 
77  Market St. Assoc. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594–95 (7th Cir. 1991); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
78  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Steven J. 
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. 
L. REV. 369, 379–80 (1980). 
79  See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
80  U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
81  See infra text accompanying notes 89–112. 
82  Jimenez v. Cintas Corp., 475 S.W.3d 679, 684–85 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
20 NEV. L.J. 503 
Spring 2020]           STOP TEACHING CONSIDERATION 515 
work was performed,83 or an employee’s post-employment promise not to 
compete or to preserve confidentiality,84 appears to be unsupported by any new 
consideration. In reality, these are post-contract modification cases, where 
courts should apply principles of economic duress, public policy, and uncon-
scionability. Instead, courts must go through doctrinal gymnastics to enforce 
reasonable changes to relational employment contracts, or instead arbitrarily 
refuse to enforce reasonable changes. 
The mortgage foreclosure crisis that began in 2008 gave new relevance to 
the post-contract modification problem. As a result of the unanticipated na-
tionwide 30 percent decline in home values, and the very high loan-to-value 
ratios of many pre-crisis mortgage loans, foreclosures reached unprecedented 
levels.85 At the same time, mortgage lenders and investors faced unprecedented 
losses on foreclosure sales, and thus had a real economic incentive to renegoti-
ate the loan terms with homeowners.86 Investors and eventually the federal 
government encouraged mortgage servicers to extend payment due dates, tem-
porarily accept reduced interest rates, and even reduce principal balances, when 
such modifications could produce a better recovery than a foreclosure sale.87 It 
could not be said that the beneficiaries of these modifications, the delinquent 
homeowners, had unfair leverage or bargaining power over the banks and giant 
financial institutions agreeing to modify their loan terms. Public policy strongly 
favored these contract modifications where homeowners had the ability to re-
pay more of their debt than banks could recover in depressed market foreclo-
sure sales. 
The federal government intervened in 2009 with the voluntary Home Af-
fordable Modification Program, which provided taxpayer-funded incentive 
payments to mortgage servicers to encourage modifications.88 HAMP pre-
scribed eligibility, application procedures, and terms for mortgage modifica-
tions.89 The key economic test for these modifications was that they be net pre-
sent value positive; that is, that the likely repayment by the homeowner, after 
rescheduling payments and reduction of interest or principal, would yield a 
 
83  See Boswell v. Panera Bread Co., 879 F.3d 296, 302 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding employer’s 
offer of a bonus based on performance enforceable using unilateral contract analysis). 
84  See Allied Waste Servs. of N. Am., LLC v. Tibble, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1107, 1109 
(N.D. Ill. 2016). 
85  Vicki Been et al., Decoding the Foreclosure Crisis: Causes, Responses, and Consequenc-
es, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 388, 388–90 (2011). 
86  See Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of 2008 Volun-
tary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 1119 (2009). 
87  Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster 
First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 
732 (2010). 
88  Id. at 729. 
89  Id. at 749–52. 
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greater present value than a foreclosure sale of the property.90 The HAMP pro-
gram, which served as a template for most mortgage modifications during the 
period, called for the mortgage servicer and borrower to enter first into a tem-
porary modification agreement, whose terms promised a permanent modifica-
tion if the borrower met all the performance conditions of the temporary modi-
fication.91 Between 2009 and 2016, more than six million mortgage loans were 
modified, including roughly two million HAMP modifications.92 
Many homeowners who signed temporary modification agreements and be-
lieved they had met the conditions to the servicers’ promise of a permanent 
modification had difficulty obtaining the permanent modifications they had 
been promised.93 Others who signed permanent modifications were told by ser-
vicers that their permanent modifications had been canceled or revoked. Litiga-
tion,94 including class actions,95 ensued. 
Mortgage servicers raised two arguments to defend their refusal or cancel-
lation of permanent modifications. First, they argued that homeowners had not 
met all the conditions precedent in the temporary modification agreements.96 
Those issues were largely factual. Second, servicers argued the pre-existing du-
ty rule: they argued that mortgage modification agreements, temporary or per-
manent, lacked consideration.97 The servicer and investor were agreeing to ac-
cept less interest, less principal, or at least later repayment, than the original 
mortgage note called for, without any quid pro quo from the homeowner.98 
Homeowners responded by pointing out that the HAMP temporary modifica-
tion agreements required them to submit updated financial information, open 
tax and insurance escrow accounts in some cases, and to consent to credit 
 
90  Steve Holden et al., The HAMP NPV Model: Development and Early Performance, 40 
REAL EST. ECON. S32, S33–34 (2012). 
91  Braucher, supra note 87, at 752–53. 
92  Making Home Affordable, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initia 
tives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
8WPL-LSWV] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019). 
93  Braucher, supra note 87, at 754–56, 760; Jonathan A. Marcantel, Enforcing the Home Af-
fordable Modification Program, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 121, 126 (2014). 
94  Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 564 (7th Cir. 2012) (assuming consider-
ation required to enforce modification and finding there was consideration for a TPP in bor-
rower’s promise to provide information); Goodman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., B243614, 
2014 WL 334222, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014) (same); Palacio v. HSBC Bank 
U.S.A., N.A., No. 10-01937, 2012 WL 4928878, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012) (find-
ing HAMP TPP not enforceable because it lacked consideration); Anilus v. OneWest Bank, 
FSB, No. NOCV201001774, 2011 WL 2735052, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 03, 2011); 
Tammy J. Raduege, Enforceability of Trial Period Plans (TPP) Under the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP), 88 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 331 (2014). 
95  E.g., Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013); Senter v. JPMor-
gan Chase Bank, N.A., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
96  E.g., Corvello, 728 F.3d at 882. 
97  E.g., Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351–52 (D. Mass. 2011). 
98  Id. at 347–48. 
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checks, all forms of “legal detriment” that amounted to consideration for the 
amended loan terms.99 
Courts divided over whether the requirements imposed on homeowners by 
the HAMP program were inducements for the modification, or simply condi-
tions on the mortgage servicers’ essentially gratuitous promise to reduce their 
payments.100 In order to obtain permanent modifications, homeowners were re-
quired to submit financial information, including verification of income and as-
sets, to open new escrow accounts for taxes and insurance, and to participate in 
credit counseling.101 Courts finding no consideration implicitly or explicitly 
held that these steps were akin to conditions for receiving a gift, rather than in-
ducements for the servicers’ promise to reduce or recast payments.102 
Oddly, few if any courts deciding these mortgage modification cases re-
ferred to the Restatement (Second) section 89 approach, permitting enforce-
ment of a modification based on changed circumstances.103 The 2008 real estate 
crash and the nationwide decline in home values was widely regarded as un-
foreseen.104 Certainly there was no historical precedent for a circumstance in 
which millions of homeowners had mortgage debt exceeding their home value, 
making it impossible to sell.105 The typical post-crisis mortgage modification 
agreement would seem to fit squarely within section 89(a), as a modification 
that is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties 
when the contract was made. The failure of courts deciding the mortgage modi-
fication cases to consider the Restatement rule is regrettable. 
Promissory estoppel claims by mortgage borrowers attempting to enforce 
modification agreements were met with similarly inconsistent results.106 Ulti-
 
99  Id. at 352 (finding consideration because homeowners agreed to provide financial infor-
mation in return for modified payments). 
100  Compare id. (finding consideration), and Healey v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 11 CV 3340, 
2012 WL 994564, at *10 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 20, 2012) (same), with Senter, 810 F. Supp. 
2d at 1348 (finding no consideration). 
101  Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 673 F.3d 547, 564 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Illinois 
law); Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 348, 352 (D. Mass. 2011). 
102  Senter, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1349. 
103  See, e.g., id. at 1339. 
104  Bruce Bartlett, Who Saw the Housing Bubble Coming?, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2009), https 
://www.forbes.com/2008/12/31/housing-bubble-crash-oped-cx_bb_0102bartlett.html#63e 
2cfec5a43 [https://perma.cc/8EXR-JMGV]; The Unofficial List of Pundits/Experts Who 
Were Wrong on the Housing Bubble, ECON. CONTEMPT (July 16, 2008, 1:15 PM), 
http://economicsofcontempt.blogspot.com/2008/07/official-list-of-punditsexperts-who.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z85A-2RPB]. 
105  E. RAY CANTERBERY, THE GLOBAL GREAT RECESSION 164–65 (2011). 
106  Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (finding no reli-
ance); Zhong v. PNC Bank, N.A., 812 S.E.2d 514, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that 
homeowner sufficiently alleged elements of promissory estoppel); Sparra v. Deutsche Bank 
Nat’l Tr. Co., 785 S.E.2d 78, 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (finding alleged promise too indefi-
nite); Mbigi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 785 S.E.2d 8, 20–21 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (finding 
homeowner adequately alleged detrimental reliance on servicer’s promise to modify mort-
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mately it appeared that the broad issues raised, potentially involving thousands 
if not millions of homeowners, were resolved piecemeal when class certifica-
tion motions were denied in various cases.107 
The values motivating the pre-existing duty rule were not advanced by 
denying enforcement of these mortgage debt modifications. First, it is hard to 
see how homeowners facing foreclosure could be engaging in a hold-up game 
against the financial behemoths servicing their mortgage loans; the bargaining 
power was clearly on the side of the banks.108 It was the homeowners, not the 
banks, who were facing severe economic duress. Second, the modified con-
tracts were in no way unfair to the mortgage investors. The whole point of 
HAMP modifications was to yield a greater net return to investors from the 
modified loan than would result from a foreclosure sale. There was thus ample 
“benefit to the promisee,” given the dramatic changes in the housing market.109 
Finally, the quid pro quo requirement for modifications does not allow for any 
consideration of public policy, that is, the effect the contract modifications 
would have on other parties. Mortgage loan modifications were motivated not 
only by solicitude for the plight of homeowners in foreclosure, but also to pre-
vent further deterioration of the general housing market caused by the glut of 
distressed foreclosure sales. The foreclosure crisis mortgage modification cases 
illustrate how poorly consideration doctrine advances the values of contract 
law. 
2. Choice of Rules 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. has abandoned the pre-existing duty rule. Section 2-
209 of the U.C.C. explicitly abrogates the consideration requirement to enforce 
contract modifications for sales of goods.110 The Official Comment notes that 
the duty of good faith permits courts to police abusive modifications extorted 
without commercial justification.111 The Restatement (Second), while incorpo-
rating the pre-existing duty rule in section 73, separately provides in section 89 
that modifications are binding if the modified promises are “fair and equitable 
in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was 
made,” or “to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of [a] materi-
al change of position in reliance on the [modified] promise,” or as provided by 
 
gage loan); Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. N.A., 373 P.3d 189, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) (find-
ing alleged promise to modify too indefinite). 
107  E.g., Memorandum of Decision at 31, In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification 
Program (HAMP) Contract Litig., MDL No. 10-2193 RWZ (D. Mass. 2013) (order denying 
class certification). 
108  NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE 
RESCUING WALL STREET 148–49 (2012). 
109  Id. at 157. 
110  U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
111  Id. § 2-209 cmt. 2. 
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statute, for example, U.C.C. section 2-209.112 Thus, the three prominent alter-
natives to the pre-existing duty rule are the U.C.C.’s full enforcement of agreed 
modifications, subject to scrutiny for good faith and duress, enforcement based 
on estoppel and reliance, and the Restatement’s change in circumstances test. 
3. The State of the Law 
While all fifty states have adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C. in whole or in 
part, including section 2-209, Restatement (Second) section 89 has been less 
widely adopted.113 In Professor Magg’s survey published in 1998, he found 
twenty-one cases citing section 89 seemingly with approval, and only one ex-
pressing a negative view.114 On closer examination, since the Restatement 
(Second)’s final adoption in 1981, only seven state courts have expressly 
adopted section 89.115 At least three state courts have expressly declined to 
adopt the Restatement and have reaffirmed the pre-existing duty rule.116 Sever-
al courts have made a passing nod to section 89 without going so far as to ex-
pressly adopt it.117 California, New York, Michigan, and South Dakota have 
abrogated the pre-existing duty rule by statute, at least for written modifications 
of written contracts,118 and Alabama, Minnesota, and Nebraska courts have 
 
112  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
113  See sources cited infra notes 114 and 115. 
114  Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern 
Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 522 (1998). 
115  New Eng. Rock Servs. v. Empire Paving, Inc., 731 A.2d 784, 789 (Conn. Ct. App. 1999); 
Nooney Krombach Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 929 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1996) (citing § 89 “we do not believe that the court was obliged to deny enforcement of the 
defendant’s promise, made to induce reliance on the part of the plaintiff, because of any ab-
sence of consideration.”); Gintzler v. Melnick, 364 A.2d 637, 640 (N.H. 1976); Smaldino v. 
Larsick, 630 N.E.2d 408, 412–13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 
636 (R.I. 1974); Guesthouse Int’l, LLC v. Shoney’s N. Am. Corp., 330 S.W.3d 166, 192 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (adopting § 89 but also finding consideration for the modification); 
Roussalis v. Wyoming Med. Ctr, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 240 (Wyo. 2000). 
116  Finger Lakes Capital Partners, LLC v. Honeoye Lake Acquisition, LLC, C.A. No. CV 
9742-VCL, 2015 WL 6455367, at *19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2015), reargument granted in part, 
No. 9742-VCL, 2015 WL 7302187 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2015), and judgment entered, No. 
9742-VCL, 2016 WL 297808 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 151 
A.3d 450 (Del. 2016) (assuming the traditional rule continues to govern under Delaware 
law); Margeson v. Artis, 776 N.W.2d 652, 657 n.5 (Iowa 2009); Zhang v. Eighth Jud. Dist. 
Ct., 103 P.3d 20, 23 (Nev. 2004). 
117  Greenberg v. Mallick Mgmt., Inc., 527 N.E.2d 943, 948–49 (III. App. Ct. 1998) (discuss-
ing preexisting duty rule, U.C.C. and section 89 at length, concluding that whether to adopt 
modern rule is “not for this court to say” and finding consideration present); Bernetich, Hat-
zell & Pascu, LLC v. Med. Records Online, Inc., 136 A.3d 955, 961 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016); 
Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 380 P.3d 1260, 1272 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (citing but 
not explicitly adopting § 89 and finding the modification too indefinite to enforce) aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part 404 P.3d 464, 479 (Wash. 2017) (finding genuine issue of fact whether 
definite modification was offered without discussing consideration or § 89). 
118  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1698 (West 2019) (retains the consideration requirement for oral mod-
ifications); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 566.1 (2019); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1103 (McKinney 
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held that consideration is not necessary to enforce modifications, without refer-
ring to the Restatement.119 On the other hand, a surprising number of courts in 
many other states continue to invoke the pre-existing duty rule, without refer-
ence to section 89, U.C.C. section 2-209, or any criticism of the rule.120 A 
number of states have expressed uncertainty or have conflicting appellate deci-
sions.121 
The pre-existing duty rule has little to recommend as a tool to resolve is-
sues around enforcement of contract modifications that are largely issues of 
economic duress and good faith.122 While contracts law teachers must recog-
nize the persistence of the old consideration-based rule, a full discussion of the 
topic ought to make the clear distinction between initial contract formation and 
contract modifications, and to normalize the modern approach. It is past time to 
relegate the pre-existing duty rule to its true place as a regrettably persistent 
vestige. 
 
2019); Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 517 (S.D. 1996) (citations 
omitted). 
119  Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634, 640–41 (Ala. 2003); Brooksbank v. An-
derson, 586 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Pennfield Oil Co. v. Winstrom, 720 
N.W.2d 886, 896 (Neb. 2006). 
120  Worden v. Crow, 427 S.W.3d 143, 147 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013); Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 
P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. 2000); Rinck v. Ass’n of Reserve City Bankers, 676 A.2d 12, 17 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 1996); Davidpur v. Counne, 972 So. 2d 891, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Carroll v. 
Bd. of Regents, 751 S.E.2d 421, 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. N.W. 
Pipeline Corp., 979 P.2d 627, 639 (Idaho 1999); AM Gen. LLC v. Armour, 46 N.E.3d 436, 
443 (Ind. 2015); Augusta Med. Complex, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Kansas, Inc., 608 P.2d 890, 
894 (Kan. 1980); Panasonic Commc’ns & Sys. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Bureau of 
Purchases, 691 A.2d 190, 194 (Me. 1997); Palacio v. HSBC USA, N.A., No. 10-01937, 2012 
WL 4928878, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012); Iuka Guar. Bank v. Beard, 658 So. 2d 
1367, 1372 (Miss. 1995); Clifford v. River Bend Plantation, Inc., 323 S.E.2d 23, 27 (N.C. 
1984); Burley v. U.S. Foods, Inc., 756 S.E.2d 84, 89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014), rev’d on other 
grounds, 776 S.E.2d 832, 836 (N.C. 2015); James v. Clackamas Cty., 299 P.3d 526, 533 (Or. 
2013); Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P., 136 A.3d 485, 490 (Pa. 2016) (“A contract, 
either oral or written, may be modified by a subsequent agreement which is supported by 
legally sufficient consideration, or a substitute therefor, and meets the requirements for con-
tract formation.”); Cardinal Dev. Co. v. Stanley Const. Co., Inc., 497 S.E.2d 847, 851 (Va. 
1998). 
121  Compare Finger Lakes Capital Partners, LLC, C.A. No. 9742-VCL, 2015 WL 6455367, 
at *19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2015) (noting section 89 but assuming consideration still required 
under Delaware law for modification), with Camden Fitness, LLC v. Wandless Enters., Inc., 
No. C.A. CPU5-12-000295, 2013 WL 8854873, at *2–3 (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 11, 2013) 
(citing and applying section 89); cf. e.g., Greenberg, 527 N.E.2d at 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), 
app. denied, 535 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. 1988) (discussing section 89 and U.C.C. § 2-209 in a 
mixed contract, and declining to adopt section 89 by finding consideration). 
122  Stephens, supra note 73, at 357. 
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C. The Firm Offer or Option Contract 
1. The Problem and Competing Values 
The unenforceability of firm offers is another problematic corollary of con-
sideration doctrine. One who proposes a contract offer may freely withdraw the 
offer at any time before it has been accepted.123 In a variety of contexts, the of-
feree might wish for the offeror to agree not to exercise that power of with-
drawal for a fixed time period, so that the offeree might engage in due dili-
gence, line up related contracts, or obtain financing.124 When the offeror 
promises not to withdraw the offer for a period of time, the promise is an option 
if the offeree pays for the promise, and is otherwise known as a firm offer.125 
While it is true that the promise not to withdraw a binding offer is a species of 
promise, it almost invariably arises in a commercial context where parties 
probably expect legal enforceability.126 
The values that would support a rule permitting an offer to be revoked, de-
spite a promise not to, are obscure. Yet that is the result of the binding offer 
corollary to consideration doctrine. While the idea that the offeror is “master of 
the offer” may advance basic notions of autonomy and freedom of contract, 
holding the offeror to a promise not to revoke an offer seems entirely consistent 
with offeror autonomy. Moreover, in a business environment such as commer-
cial real estate, or large construction projects, parties often must rely on the du-
rability of contract offers in order to negotiate other related contracts. For ex-
ample, the real estate buyer relies on loan and title insurance commitments in 
order to proceed with a purchase. The general contractor relies on bids by sub-
contractors to price its main contract offer. Even in the absence of reliance in 
the sense of a change in position, there is no obvious reason an offeror should 
not be free to make an offer irrevocable for a reasonable time. 
2. Choice of Rules 
A corollary to the consideration doctrine makes firm offers legally unen-
forceable. The corollary is that that a promise not to withdraw an offer, no mat-
ter how formally made, is a separate promise, and is not enforceable, unless the 
offeree has paid money or otherwise exchanged value for the promise, in other 
words, purchased an option.127 In contrast, the rule adopted in the Restatement 
(Second) is to enforce any firm offer that is in a signed writing and “recites a 
 
123  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 22 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
124  Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 271, 282–91 (2004). 
125  Id. at 279. 
126  Id. at 291. 
127  James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933); Eisenberg supra 
note 124, at 281 (contending that the common law rule is the product of indefensible formal 
legal reasoning). 
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purported consideration.”128 For sales of goods, the U.C.C. Article Two makes 
binding any firm offer made by a merchant in writing.129 Various state statutes 
also make written binding offers enforceable without proof of actual considera-
tion.130 Even offers that are not expressly made irrevocable for a period of time 
may be treated as binding when the offeree reasonably and foreseeably relies 
on the offer, as in the case of a general contractor who uses a subcontractor’s 
bid to price a general contract bid.131 Professor Eisenberg has advocated going 
further by removing the remaining obstacles (the signed writing, the recital of 
consideration) and making all promises not to withdraw or revoke an offer 
binding.132 
3. The State of the Law 
The U.C.C. is of course the law in all fifty states. Consideration is thus ir-
relevant in deciding whether to enforce binding offers for sales of goods. As for 
contracts outside of Article Two, state courts appear to remain divided. Some 
courts have adopted the Restatement (Second) section 87(1) and accept a sim-
ple written recital of consideration, to support a firm offer.133 However, the ma-
jority of state courts continue to apply the rule that separate consideration is re-
quired to support an option contract.134 Opinions applying the consideration 
rule rarely if ever offer any values promoted by the rule, and in some cases 
even cite Restatement (Second) section 87 without explaining why they are not 
following it.135 
The reliance prong of the Restatement section 87 rule seems to have gained 
broader acceptance.136 For example, the Iowa Supreme Court recently held that 
 
128  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 87(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
129  U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
130  E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1109 (McKinney 2019). 
131  Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS, § 87(2). 
132  Eisenberg, supra note 124, at 288–89. 
133  Knott v. Racicot, 812 N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (Mass. 2004); 1464-Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 
S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex. 2004); see also Smith v. Wheeler, 210 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ga. 1974) 
(enforcing an option reciting a one dollar nominal consideration). 
134  Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. KFX, Inc., 153 F.3d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying 
Missouri law); Polk v. BHRGU Avon Props., LLC, 946 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006); Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834, 835–36 (Idaho 1980) (explicitly rejecting the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(1) and holding that a written option agreement that 
contains a fictional recital of a nominal consideration is unenforceable for lack of considera-
tion); see also Berryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d 790, 793 (Kan. 1977) (same); Country Club 
Oil Co. v. Lee, 58 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. 1953); McLellan v. Charly, 758 N.W.2d 94, 101 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Foy v. Foy, 484 So. 2d 439, 442–43 (Ala.1986)). 
135  Polk, 946 So. 2d at 1122; Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Spelman, No. 63164, 1992 WL 
390216, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
136  Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 179–81 (Mass. 1978); 
Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Expl. Co., 916 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. 1996); e.g., Pavel Enters. v. 
A.S. Johnson Co., Inc., 674 A.2d 521, 529 (Md. Ct. App. 1996). 
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an oral option for the sale of a farm to a tenant could be enforced based on 
promissory estoppel, in the absence of either a writing or consideration.137 It is 
therefore difficult to synthesize a rule for law students to accurately describe 
the state of the law regarding binding offers. The best appraisal may be this: 
that there is a modern approach upholding offers expressing an intent not to 
withdraw with requisite written formality; that an offer may be found irrevoca-
ble because of reasonable and foreseeable pre-acceptance reliance; but that 
many states cling to an older rule limiting binding offers to those supported by 
a separate payment or exchange. 
D. Discharged Past Debts and Promises Recognizing Past Benefits 
1. The Problem 
Consideration doctrine can also be an obstacle to enforcing promises to re-
affirm past debts or honor moral obligations. One example is an employer’s 
promise of payments in recognition of past services that had been rendered gra-
tuitously.138 These promises often advance equity values when a wealthy prom-
isor recognizes past failure to compensate a less wealthy promisee. On the oth-
er hand, enforcing a distressed debtor’s promise to reaffirm a debt discharged 
in bankruptcy or by the statute of limitations may further impoverish an indi-
gent worker. For that reason, the Bankruptcy Code requires attorney or court 
review of any agreement to reaffirm a discharged debt principally to guard 
against economic duress.139 
In a relational contract setting, parties working together on numerous 
commercial projects may at some point feel that a prior contract has been 
breached, and agree to wipe the slate clean, as it were, in exchange for a new 
promise.140 In these cases, admittedly, it seems less clear that enforcement ad-
vances justice by protecting reliance by the promisee, although certainly reli-
ance may result from these revived promises. In many cases, however, courts 
and parties may feel that a promise to pay for past services really reflects the 
 
137  Kunde v. Estate of Bowman, 920 N.W.2d 803, 805, 812 (Iowa 2018). 
138  Watkins v. Watkins, 402 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Idaho 2017) (holding that a father’s promise 
to compensate his son for past services and injuries was unenforceable for lack of considera-
tion, without reference to the Second Restatement § 86). 
139  11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(3)(I) (2018); see also Marianne B. Culhane and Michaela M. White, 
Debt after Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 715 
(1999). 
140  Loper v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 203 So. 3d 898, 904–05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) 
(holding contractor’s post-contract promise to replace windows and extend warranty was 
enforceable because homeowner’s agreement not to sue for defective work was valid consid-
eration); c.f. Cityscapes Dev., LLC v. Scheffler, 866 N.W.2d 66, 70 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) 
(holding promise to pay broker commission on expired listing agreement unenforceable, 
mostly to effectuate statutory restriction on broker override clauses, essentially on grounds 
of public policy, although broker might have argued resolution of bona fide dispute). 
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resolution of what would otherwise be a restitution claim (hence the occasional 
use of the phrase “promissory restitution”).141 
An interesting case illustrating the unhelpfulness of consideration doctrine 
involved a seemingly one-sided (and badly written) letter agreement between a 
lawyer and his client.142 In the letter agreement, the lawyer referred to unpaid 
legal bills owed to his firm (and not him personally) as well as a “50-50 part-
nership” that “[a]t least one of us had in mind . . . .”143 These recitals were fol-
lowed by the client’s promise to pay $25,000 monthly towards the legal bills, 
$500,000 with interest, and 5 percent of the gross receipts of a real estate de-
velopment.144 Viewed in the light most favorable to the attorney, he and his cli-
ent had apparently worked on several commercial real estate projects, the attor-
ney believed he had a bona fide claim to a partnership share that the client had 
promised but never delivered, and this letter agreement was a bona fide resolu-
tion of his claims.145 
The court rejected the plaintiff attorney’s argument that the client’s prom-
ises were in return for settlement of past disputes, because the letter did not in-
clude any release of claims, or promise not to sue, by the attorney.146 The court 
spent a considerable part of its analysis on the New York statute that makes 
promises to pay for past services rendered enforceable if the promise is in writ-
ing and recites the “past consideration.”147 Dividing the letter agreement into 
three separate promises by the client, the court found that only the agreement to 
pay past legal bills to the attorney’s firm sufficiently recited the “past consider-
ation.”148 The second and third promises to pay $500,000 and a percentage of 
future receipts to the lawyer were not supported by any written recital describ-
ing the past services for which this money was to be paid, and the vague refer-
ence to a “50-50 partnership” was held not to be sufficient description of past 
consideration.149 
One suspects that the heart of the matter here was an attorney overreaching 
in a contract with someone who was both a client and a business partner. The 
court makes no mention of the attorney’s fiduciary duty, or of the rules of pro-
fessional conduct governing the establishment and collection of attorney fees, 
but one suspects the skepticism with which the court viewed this contract 
stemmed in part from the fact that an attorney was exacting generous terms 
from a former client. Had the two parties both been real estate investors, the 
 
141  See Stanley D. Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrich-
ment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1971). 
142  Korff v. Corbett, 65 N.Y.S.3d 498, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
143  Id. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. at 500–01. 
146  Id. at 503–04. 
147  Id. at 502–03. 
148  Id. at 503. 
149  Id. at 503–04. 
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court might have overlooked the informality of the letter and simply invoked 
the principle that courts will not look behind a voluntary bargain. Applying ei-
ther unconscionability or undue influence doctrine would have permitted the 
court to examine why the client agreed to this arrangement, rather than apply-
ing formalistic rules in a search for consideration, past or present. 
2. Choice of Rules 
The traditional consideration rule is that a promise made in recognition of 
past services not rendered in exchange for the promise, or a promise to reaffirm 
a discharged debt, would be unenforceable.150 A promise that appears to reaf-
firm a discharged or unenforceable debt may, however, be supported by valid 
consideration if the past debt may be characterized as disputed, rather than un-
enforceable, so that the new promise is in settlement of a bona fide dispute.151 
Similarly, the promise to reward past services given gratuitously could be re-
cast as a resolution of a potential restitution claim, assuming the promisee 
agrees to accept the new promise in lieu of restitution. On the other hand, the 
Restatement (Second) dispenses with consideration in both instances.152 It 
makes promises to reaffirm discharged debts enforceable despite the absence of 
a new exchange153 and makes promises in recognition of past benefits or ser-
vices enforceable without consideration “to the extent necessary to prevent in-
justice.”154 The Restatement section 86 principle permitting enforcement of 
promises recognizing past benefits extends only to past benefits or services 
originally provided gratuitously. If the new promise is one to make additional 
payments for services that were the subject of a prior contract, it is not enforce-
able, even if the promisor is recognizing the inadequacy or injustice of the prior 
contract.155 A promise to make such a bonus payment might in some cases be 
characterized as a modification, if the contract is still executory, enforceable 
based on an unexpected change in circumstances.156 
3. The State of the Law 
Cases raising these issues are infrequent, giving rise to the question wheth-
er they need to be covered in an introductory contracts law course at all. Only 
thirteen cases from eleven state and federal courts and the federal court of 
claims even cite section 86.157 Of those, only four adopt section 86 or at least 
 
150  PERILLO, supra note 69, at § 5.2. 
151  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
152  Id. §§ 82–94. 
153  Id. §§ 82–85. 
154  Id. § 86. 
155  Id. § 86 cmt. f. 
156  See supra text accompanying note 103. 
157  Jennings v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 764, 771 (Fed. Cl. 2016); First Nat’l Bankshares 
of Beloit, Inc. v. Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1344, 1357 (D. Kan. 1994); In re Nat’l Audit Def. 
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cite it approvingly.158 The Tennessee Supreme Court held explicitly that “past 
consideration” will never support promise enforcement, in a case where the dis-
sent cited section 86.159 Even among the cases in the three-year survey of con-
sideration headnotes, only six cases not referencing the Restatement could be 
said to raise “past consideration” issues.160 New York and California have es-
sentially codified section 86 by statute.161 However, treatises continue to refer 
to section 86 as a minority rule.162 These rare cases still have value as illustra-
tions to help students differentiate bargained-for exchange theory from reliance 
and restitution as alternative bases to enforce promises. Given that they often 
arise in family contexts,163 the cases also offer an occasion to discuss feminist 
and other critical perspectives on contract law and theory. 
E. The “Illusory Promise” and the Very One-Sided Deal 
1. The Problem and Competing Values 
If a contract gives one party the discretionary authority to cancel the con-
tract, to determine what goods or services it will provide or purchase, or to 
change any or all terms at will, is it a contract at all? The illusory promise doc-
trine makes the other party’s promises unenforceable if one party’s duties are 
truly optional, for want of a true exchange.164 The problem of one-sided discre-
tion in most cases is not so much about whether a contract has been formed, but 
rather whether through an abuse of bargaining power or otherwise, one party 
 
Network, 332 B.R. 896, 920 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005); Edelson v. Cheung, No. 13-5870 (JLL), 
2015 WL 5316651, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2015); Starr v. Katz, No. 91-3365, 1994 WL 
548209, at *13 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1994); Realty Assoc. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 
1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Knight v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Emp.’s Ret. Sys., 273 Cal. 
Rptr. 120, 145 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Ketterle v. Ketterle, 814 N.E.2d 385, 390 (Mass. 
Ct. App. 2004); McMurry v. Magnusson, 849 S.W.2d 619, 623 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); 
Salas v. Mafnas, No. 2008-SCC-0037-CIV, 2010 WL 2332075, at *15 n.11 (N. Mar. I. June 
8, 2010); Meadows v. Langlais Constr. Co., No. C.A. 80-2966, 1984 WL 560340, at *2 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. 1984); Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tenn. 2004); Dulany Foods, Inc. 
v. Ayers, 260 S.E.2d 196, 203 (Va. 1979) (Poff, J., dissenting). 
158  Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1344 at 1357; Realty Assoc., 738 P.2d at 1125; McMurry, 849 
S.W.2d at 622–23; Meadows, 1984 WL 560340, at *3. 
159  Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 600, 607. 
160  Stemcells, Inc. v. Neuralstem, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 3d 623, 637–38 (D. Md. 2015); Watkins 
v. Watkins, 402 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Idaho 2017); Chandra v. Chandra, 53 N.E.3d 186, 191 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2016); Cityscapes Dev., LLC v. Scheffler, 866 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2015); Korff v. Corbett, 65 N.Y.S.3d 498, 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); Nicholas v. Hofmann, 
158 A.3d 675, 687 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). 
161  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1606 (West 2019); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1105 (McKinney 
2019). 
162  PERILLO, supra note 69, at § 5.4. 
163  See, e.g., Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 595 (postnuptial agreement); see also Chandra, 53 
N.E.3d at 186. 
164  Bowers v. Asbury St. Louis Lex, LLC, 478 S.W.3d 423, 426–27 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 77 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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has secured an unfairly one-sided deal. Courts and scholars attached to the bar-
gain theory of contract have rescued seemingly illusory contracts using inter-
pretation devices, for example the duty of good faith famously invoked by 
Judge Cardozo in Wood v. Lucy, to cabin the apparent unfettered discretion.165 
Professor Eisenberg argues sensibly that a contract in which one party makes 
truly nonbinding promises may reflect sensible business judgments, and that 
when they are the product of deception or unfair bargaining, unconscionability 
and other defenses can handle the problem.166 
This problem arises frequently in two categories of contemporary cases: 
the at-will employment contract and mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts. In an at-will employment contract, the employee is free to quit, and 
the employer free to fire the employee, at any time.167 Courts have struggled 
with the question whether an at-will employment contract contains any mean-
ingful promises exchanged for an employee’s promise not to compete.168 Con-
sumers have also challenged a variety of standardized form contracts that per-
mit a merchant to change terms or opt out of promises essentially at will.169 
2. Choice of Rules 
Traditional consideration doctrine on the one hand denies enforcement to a 
party making only illusory promises, but on the other hand finds a variety of 
stratagems to avoid holding a promise truly illusory.170 The duty of good faith 
may be called upon to constrain the party’s apparently unfettered discretion, as 
in the case of exclusive dealings or requirements contracts.171 If the party with 
discretion must provide any advance notice before withdrawing from the con-
tract, that promise is usually found sufficient to overcome the illusory promise 
 
165  Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214, 214–15 (N.Y. 1917). 
166  Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 649–
52 (1982). 
167  See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
427, 433 (2016). 
168  Id. at 442–43. 
169  See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1649–51 n.93, 98, 103–04 (2005). Compare Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., 141 F. 
Supp. 3d 1051, 1057–58, 1064–66, 1071, 1075 (S.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom., 709 F. 
App’x 862 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding credit card agreement not illusory despite change-in-
terms provision by invoking duty of good faith), with Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 
669 F.3d 202, 204–06, 209 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding employment contract illusory because of 
employer’s change-in-terms provision). 
170  PERILLO, supra note 69, at § 4.12. 
171  U.C.C. § 2-306 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); see also id. § 2-311 (dis-
cretion to specify particulars of performance must be exercised in good faith). But see Office 
Pavilion S. Florida, Inc. v. ASAL Prods., Inc., 849 So. 2d 367, 367–71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2003) (holding that a requirements contract lacked consideration, without reference to § 2-
306 of the U.C.C.). 
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problem.172 Courts are divided as to whether an employer’s promise of at-will 
employment is illusory, and therefore whether employee noncompete promises 
are enforceable.173 
3. The State of the Law 
The illusory promise theory has recently emerged in challenges to arbitra-
tion clauses in consumer contracts and noncompete and confidentiality agree-
ments in at-will employment contracts.174 The consumer and employment cases 
highlight the fact that unconscionability is a far superior doctrinal solution to 
the problem of excessive discretion than the illusory contract doctrine. The 
consideration-based illusory contract rule is so easily circumvented that one 
wonders why merchants and employers still occasionally fail to overcome it. 
Courts may refuse to enforce contracts found to be procedurally and substan-
tively unconscionable, weighing not only the imbalance in the parties’ duties 
and obligations, but also their relative bargaining power and the process by 
which the contract was negotiated, or adhered to. The employee noncompete 
cases discussed below175 also show that public policy approaches, that frankly 
assess the fairness of these troublesome contracts, are what is really going on 
even when courts invoke an absence of consideration as the reason to deny en-
forcement. If a purely illusory promise can be “fixed” by requiring some good 
faith or notice period in exercising the discretion, it can still be separately eval-
uated for unconscionability. Among the 186 cases decided in the past three 
years classified as consideration cases only two invalidated a contract on the 
grounds that one party’s promises were illusory, and both could have been bet-
ter analyzed as unconscionability or public policy cases.176 Given this, it is un-
clear what useful work the illusory promise consideration corollary is still do-
ing. In any event, the discussion of the illusory promise concept in contracts 
class could better be incorporated in the discussion of unconscionability and 
public policy defenses. 
 
172  La Frontera Ctr., Inc. v. United Behavioral Health, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1177–78, 
1226 (D.N.M. 2017); Neurodiagnostic Tex, L.L.C. v. Pierce, 506 S.W.3d 153, 159, 163–64 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2016). 
173  Compare Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 576–78, 584 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(holding employee non-compete agreement invalid under Texas law), with Horter Inv. 
Mgmt., LLC v. Cutter, 257 F. Supp. 3d 892, 897, 901–02 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (continued at-
will employment was sufficient consideration to support employee confidentiality agreement 
under Ohio law). 
174  See infra text accompanying notes 268–78. 
175  See infra text accompanying notes 268–78. 
176  Hunn, 789 F.3d at 576–78, 584; Bowers v. Asbury St. Louis Lex, LLC, 478 S.W.3d 423, 
426–28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
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F. The Third-Party Guarantee 
1. The Problem and Values 
A lender seeking additional protection for its loan will often ask officers or 
owners of a corporate borrower to provide personal guarantees. The question 
whether the guarantors’ promise to pay is supported by consideration has often 
masked issues of economic duress or unconscionability.177 In the classic sce-
nario, a corporate owner or officer brings in a spouse who is not involved in the 
business as guarantor, and when the business defaults, the spouse is faced with 
the perhaps unexpected duty to repay the business loan. In another scenario, a 
business about to default or having already defaulted on a loan is required to 
obtain personal guarantees in return for forbearance from foreclosure or other 
drastic collection action. In both scenarios, the underlying issues are the availa-
bility of small business credit on the one hand, and issues of informed assent, 
economic duress, and unconscionable overreaching by lenders on the other 
hand. 
2. Choice of Rules 
Consideration doctrine is not particularly helpful in sorting enforceable 
guarantees from unenforceable guarantees. In the initial loan guarantee scenar-
io, and in the post-default scenario with forbearance, the lender obviously suf-
fers a detriment (an advance of loan money), so the consideration question is 
whether that detriment (loan or forbearance) was induced by the guarantee. 
Guarantors seeking to void their promise must attempt to prove that the lender 
would have made the loan (or the forbearance or workout) even without the 
guarantee.178 Except in the rare case where there is a written loan approval 
without the guarantee, and the guarantor is brought in as an afterthought,179 the 
absence of inducement is difficult to prove. Courts occasionally still confuse 
the issues, focusing on the benefit/detriment aspect, which is not at issue, rather 
than the inducement issue.180 The Restatement (Second) section 88 rules for 
guarantees depart from consideration, making a guaranty promise enforceable, 
similar to firm offers, so long as it is in writing and “recites a purported consid-
eration,” or if the promise induces reasonable and foreseeable reliance.181 
 
177  See United States v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590, 594, 598–99 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding wife’s 
guarantee unenforceable without reference to possible duress or unconscionability). 
178  E.g., Kansas City Live Block 125 Retail, LLC v. Bhakta, 476 S.W.3d 326, 328–30, 332 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (upholding trial court finding that guarantee was required to induce the 
loan, and therefore supported by sufficient consideration). 
179  See Meadors, 753 F.2d at 597–98. 
180  In re Floyd, 540 B.R. 747, 751, 753–54 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2015), aff’d sub nom., No. 
1:13-bk-02134-TLM, 2016 WL 1733433 (D. Idaho Apr. 29, 2016) (court finds there was 
consideration for a post-default guarantee, without addressing whether any new advance or 
forbearance was given at the time of the guarantee). 
181  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 88 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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More importantly, the real issues of duress and overreaching are better ad-
dressed by explicitly relying on the defense doctrines (fraud, mistake, uncon-
scionability, duress, undue influence). The gender bias that historically plagued 
loan guarantees was addressed to some extent in provisions of the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act and implementing regulations, which restrict lenders from im-
posing unnecessary guarantee requirements on spouses.182 
3. The State of the Law 
The Restatement (Second) provides that third-party guarantees are enforce-
able without regard to consideration, if they are signed and in writing.183 Our 
survey of recent cases did not uncover a single case invalidating a third-party 
guaranty for want of consideration.184 Federal law now includes two statutory 
rules to protect consumers from improvident guarantees. The Federal Trade 
Commission’s 1976 Credit Practices Rule makes it an illegal unfair trade prac-
tice to misrepresent the nature or extent of cosigner liability in a consumer 
credit transaction.185 The rule requires merchants to provide cosigners with a 
specified written disclosure warning the cosigners of their potential liability.186 
Regulations under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act are also intended to pro-
tect guarantors from creditor overreaching, taking aim at a once-common prac-
tice that discriminates against female applicants.187 A creditor may not require a 
spouse to cosign an extension of credit when the applicant meets the creditor’s 
credit standards.188 The subject of third-party guarantees is also extensively 
regulated by the law of sureties and U.C.C. Article 3,189 and thus is perhaps 
best omitted from introductory contracts law classes. 
III. CONSIDERATION IN THE COURTS 
A. Many Cases Referring to “Consideration” Did Not Turn on True 
Consideration Issues 
Although contemporary state and federal court opinions continue to invoke 
the doctrine of consideration, the cases often involve issues better analyzed 
with other contact law principles, and sometimes reveal that judges may be as 
confused as law students about the meaning of consideration. The Westlaw key 
 
182  12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) (2019). 
183  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 88 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
184  Cf. Martin Printing, Inc. v. Sone, 873 A.2d 232, 234, 238–39 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (re-
jecting an argument that guarantee lacked consideration and also applying Restatement 
(Second) § 88). 
185  16 C.F.R. § 444.3(a)(1) (2019). 
186  Id. § 444.3(c). 
187  12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d). 
188  Id. 
189  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SECURITY AND SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (AM. LAW INST. 
1996); U.C.C. § 3-419 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
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number system includes no fewer than forty-four different topics under the ru-
bric of consideration,190 including all of the corollaries, as well as topics like 
“adequacy of consideration” and “failure of consideration”, which as we shall 
see, are misnomers for other contract law doctrines (unconscionability and ma-
terial breach, respectively). A Westlaw search for cases coded by West under 
these forty-four different headings in state and federal courts for a recent three-
year period (June 2015 to June 2018) produces citations to a surprising 181 
cases.191 On closer examination, however, few if any of these cases turned on 
true consideration issues. Although forty cases resulted in denial of enforce-
ment, most of these could have been decided on other grounds, or would have 
come out differently had the courts applied Restatement rules.192 One hundred 
and sixty-eight of the 181 cases discussing consideration involved business or 
commercial exchange transactions, and even the ten family disputes mostly in-
volved either negotiated pre- or post-marital agreements or estate disputes.193 
No reported cases resembled the casual, social, or family promises that are the 
grist of casebooks and law school classrooms, and that consideration theory is 
supposed to help filter out of the judicial system. 
B. Cases Denying Enforcement for Want of Consideration Mostly Involve 
Indefinite Promises or Consideration Corollaries 
Of the forty cases where courts denied enforcement of a promise while in-
voking consideration, thirty-four involved business transactions, including em-
ployment, insurance, loans, and real estate contracts.194 These were promises 
that scholars advocating for a commercial exchange test would find enforceable 
(setting aside indefiniteness and contract defense issues).195 Four of the forty 
 
190  West Key Number System, 95(I)(D), Nos. 47–91 (accessible through Westlaw.com by 
selecting “Key Numbers” under the “Content types” tab, then selecting No. 95 “Contracts” 
where subsection “(D) Consideration” can be found). 
191  Westlaw search conducted June 11, 2018, all Federal and all state cases, Key numbers 47 
to 91, filtered for cases in past 3 years. The search produced 353 headnotes to 181 unique 
cases. See Appendix I, on file with author. A similar search for Key numbers 1 to 46 (capaci-
ty, offer and acceptance) for the past three years yielded 801 headnotes, and 1,780 headnotes 
for all Contracts key number topics. By this rough measure about 20 percent (353/1780) of 
contracts headnotes were classified as “consideration” issues by West in state and federal 
cases decided in this three-year period. 
192  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 82–90 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
193  See Appendix I, on file with author. 
194  E.g., Cityscapes Dev., LLC v. Scheffler, 866 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (real 
estate); Roller v. Am. Modern Home Ins. Co., 484 S.W.3d 110, 112–13 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) 
(insurance). See Appendix I, on file with author. 
195  Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 36, at 271; see also Daniel A. Farber & John H. 
Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake”, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 904–05 (1985); James D. Gordon III, Consideration and the Commer-
cial-Gift Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. REV. 283, 286 (1991). 
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cases involved family promises196 and two arose in disputes between parents 
and schools around their child’s education.197 From this perspective, the gate-
keeping function of consideration doctrine appears to be missing the mark. 
Of these forty cases denying enforcement, seven denied enforcement of 
seemingly gratuitous promises.198 Of the seven gratuitous promise cases, two 
raised post-contract issues: a promise to forbear enforcement of a debt,199 and 
an insurer’s promise to pay a claim.200 One case involving a gratuitous assign-
ment of contract rights was reversed on appeal.201 Of the remaining four cases, 
three were family promises,202 and one found that a school’s individualized ed-
ucation plan was not an enforceable contract.203 
The cases not involving gratuitous promises denied enforcement based on 
consideration corollaries. Four cases purported to find reciprocal promises illu-
sory.204 Ten were based on the pre-existing duty rule denying effect to post-
contract modifications.205 Three cases involved firm offers,206 three turned on 
past consideration,207 and one involved a third-party guarantee and release.208 
 
196  Watkins v. Watkins, 402 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Idaho 2017); Haines-Marchel v. Wash. State 
Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 406 P.3d 1199, 1216 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017); Young v. Young, 808 
S.E.2d 631, 642 (W. Va. 2017); Willey v. Willey, 385 P.3d 290, 293 (Wyo. 2016). 
197  Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 66 N.E.3d 507, 513–15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (finding 
no real promise and no consideration); SH v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 409 P.3d 1231, 
1231–32 (Wyo. 2018) (finding that individualized education program was not a contract). 
198  Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 125 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494 (D. De. 2015), rev’d, 837 F.3d 356 (3d 
Cir. 2016); Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); Roller, 
484 S.W.3d at 114–15; Voccola v. Forte, 139 A.3d 404, 414–15 (R.I. 2016); Haines-
Marchel, 406 P.3d at 1216; SH, 409 P.3d at 1233–34; Willey, 385 P.3d at 301. 
199  Orcilla, 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 734. 
200  Roller, 484 S.W.3d at 113. 
201  Wallach, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 488. 
202  Haines-Marchel, 406 P.3d at 1216; Young, 808 S.E.2d at 642; Willey, 385 P.3d at 293. 
203  SH, 409 P.3d at 1233. 
204  Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F. 3d 573, 584 (5th Cir. 2015) (employee non-
compete unenforceable because employment was at will); DiCosola v. Ryan, 44 N.E.3d 556, 
561–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (finding stock grant unenforceable because officer’s promise of 
future services was illusory); Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 435 (Mo. 2015) 
(describing the issue as unconscionability rather than an illusory promise); Bowers v. Asbury 
St. Louis Lex, LLC, 478 S.W.3d 423, 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (finding arbitration clause 
unenforceable when employer retained unilateral right to modify or terminate); Motormax 
Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Knight, 474 S.W.3d 164, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (invalidating arbitra-
tion clause for lack of mutuality, citing a Missouri supreme court case). 
205  Michael Shane Enters., LLC v. Courtroom Connect Corp., 664 F. App’x. 850, 852–53 
(11th Cir. 2016); Barrett-O’Neill v. Lalo, LLC, 171 F. Supp. 3d 725, 740 (S.D. Ohio 2016); 
McInnis v. OAG Motorcycle Ventures, Inc., 35 N.E.3d 1076, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); AM 
Gen. LLC v. Armour, 46 N.E.3d 436, 443 (Ind. 2015); Yoches v. City of Dearborn, 904 
N.W.2d 887, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017), appeal denied, 911 N.W.2d 189 (Mich. 2018); 
Safety Ctr., Inc. v. Stier, 903 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017); Barclay Petroleum, 
Inc., v. Bailey, 96 N.E.3d 811, 821 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017), appeal allowed, 92 N.E.3d 878 
(Ohio 2018), appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed, 123 N.E.3d 947 (Ohio 2018); 
Cuspide Props., Ltd. v. Earl Mech. Servs., 53 N.E.3d 818, 830 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); Socko 
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The remaining cases, while described by courts and coded by West as 
denying enforcement based on “consideration,” involved other contract law 
rules. Four cases denied enforcement on public policy grounds,209 one referred 
to a breach as a failure of consideration,210 and seven found promises too indef-
inite to enforce.211 
Apart from the cases resting on the problematic consideration corollaries, 
the remainder either involved seemingly gratuitous promises or were cases 
readily explainable without resort to consideration doctrine. 
1. Gratuitous Promise Cases 
Some promises found to lack consideration were made in the context of 
prior bargained-for exchanges. For example, an insurer’s promise to settle a fire 
loss claim under an existing insurance contract was found both too indefinite 
and unsupported by consideration (in the absence of a release from the policy-
holder).212 A mortgagee’s promise to postpone a foreclosure sale (arising from 
the mortgagor’s default on an existing loan transaction) was found unenforcea-
ble for want of consideration.213 Because the homeowners did not allege any 
conduct that would amount to detrimental reliance, the promise was also not 
enforceable based on promissory estoppel.214 The homeowner and lender al-
 
v. Mid-Atlantic Sys. of CPA, Inc., 126 A.3d 1266, 1278 (Pa. 2015); Eurecat US, Inc. v. 
Marklund, 527 S.W.3d 367, 387, 390 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017). 
206  In re First Phoenix-Weston, LLC, 575 B.R. 828, 847 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017); Young v. 
Young, 808 S.E.2d 631, 633, 636 (W. Va. 2017); Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Hickman, 
781 S.E.2d 198, 208, 216 (W. Va. 2015). 
207  Watkins v. Watkins, 402 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Idaho 2017); Cityscapes Dev., LLC v. 
Scheffler, 866 N.W.2d 66, 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015); Korff v. Corbett, 65 N.Y.S.3d 498, 502 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
208  New v. T3 Invs. Corp., 55 N.E.3d 870, 878–79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
209  Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1043 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2017), appeal denied, 93 N.E.3d 1043 (Ill. 2017); Bernetich, Hatzell & Pascu, LLC v. 
Med. Records Online, Inc., 136 A.3d 955, 961–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016); Ameri-
gas Propane, LP v. Coffey, No. 14 CVS 376, 2015 WL 60903207, at *7 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 15, 2015); Wharton Physician Servs, PA v. Signature Gulf Coast Hosp., LP, No. 13-14-
00437-CV, 2016 WL 192069, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2016). 
210  Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II, PC, 275 F. Supp. 3d 584, 600 
(E.D. Pa. 2017), rev’d sub nom., 935 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2019). 
211  Ingham Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 1, 26 (Fed. Cl. 2016), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 874 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Summerhill, LLC v. City of Meriden, 
131 A.3d 1225, 1229 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016); Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 66 N.E.3d 
507, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); Sara v. Saint Joseph Healthcare Sys., Inc., 480 S.W.3d 286, 
290–91 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015); Vista Food Exch., Inc. v. BenefitMall, 138 A.D.3d 535, 536 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Dittman v. UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 326 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), vacated 
on other grounds, 196 A.3d 1036, 1056 (Pa. 2018); Andoscia v. Town of N. Smithfield, 159 
A.3d 79, 82 (R.I. 2017). 
212  Roller v. Am. Modern Home Ins. Co., 484 S.W.3d 110, 113, 115 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
213  Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
214  Id. at 735. 
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ready had an enforceable contract, so this case could have been better analyzed 
as involving questions of material breach, waiver and modification. In any 
event, the same court found the homeowners adequately alleged that the origi-
nal mortgage loan was unconscionable, so that they might set aside the foreclo-
sure sale on that basis.215 
Of the remaining four gratuitous promise cases, three were family promis-
es216 and one found that a school’s individualized education plan was not an 
enforceable contract.217 In a classic “dad-promised-me-the-farm” case, a son’s 
claim of a father’s oral promise to convey the family ranch was rejected on 
multiple grounds, including the absence of any definite promise, any exchange 
of services or detrimental reliance, or any written evidence of a promise.218 The 
absence of bargained-for exchange was unnecessary to the result, because the 
father had clearly expressed his intention to leave the property to his wife, ra-
ther than to his son, in various trust documents.219 It was not only consideration 
that was missing, but the promise itself. One family dispute involved an alleg-
edly gratuitous binding option,220 while another held unenforceable a unilateral 
promise to relinquish a spouse’s claim to equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty.221 
2. Indefinite Promise Cases 
Courts may refer to a lack of consideration when they are simply finding 
the absence of any clear and definite promise, applying a basic rule of offer and 
acceptance.222 For example, a town was found not to have promised its part-
time zoning inspector a two-year employment contract when an appointment 
letter referred to a term “expiring” after two years, but the town ordinance said 
the position in question would serve at the pleasure of the town administra-
tor.223 The court held the employee failed to demonstrate a bargained-for ex-
change.224 The court did not explain why a promise to work for two years 
would not support a reciprocal promise not to fire the employee without 
cause.225 The true shortcoming in the employee’s claim was either a public pol-
icy against long-term employment in this position (perhaps to preserve town 
 
215  Id. at 728–29. 
216  Haines-Marchel v. Wash. State Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 406 P.3d 1199, 1204 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2017); Young v. Young, 808 S.E.2d 631, 633 (W. Va. 2017); Willey v. Willey, 385 
P.3d 290, 293 (Wyo. 2016). 
217  SH v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 409 P.3d 1231, 1232 (Wyo. 2018). 
218  Willey, 385 P.3d at 301. 
219  See id. at 295, 302. 
220  Young, 808 S.E.2d at 633. 
221  Haines-Marchel, 406 P.3d at 1204, 1216. 
222  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 24, 33 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
223  Andoscia v. Town of N. Smithfield, 159 A.3d 79, 80, 82 (R.I. 2017). 
224  Id. at 82. 
225  See id. 
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budget flexibility), or simply a failure to prove that a true promise of long-term 
employment was even made (the indefinite offer problem). 
Another example of an indefinite promise arose in an action by employees 
suing their hospital employer for breach of an implied promise to safeguard 
personal data lost in a computer data breach. The court held that the employees 
did not allege that the hospital ever objectively manifested an intent to enter in-
to a contract, that is, no implied promise was even alleged.226 As a makeweight, 
the court added that the employees “did not give their information to [the em-
ployer] for the consideration of its safe keeping, but instead, for employment 
purposes,” and therefore consideration was lacking.227 This reasoning was both 
unnecessary and incorrect. If there had been a clear employer promise to safe-
guard employee information, it would clearly have been induced by the em-
ployee’s work or promise to work. If the result in this case was correct, offer 
and acceptance doctrine was fully adequate to reach it. 
Similarly, an Illinois court denied enforcement of an alleged implied con-
tract between worker’s compensation insurers and health-care providers relying 
on backwards application of consideration doctrine, rather than a straightfor-
ward analysis of offer and acceptance and third-party beneficiary doctrine.228 
The insurers contracted with employers to pay for the health care of injured 
employees.229 The medical provider plaintiffs asserted in the alternative that 
they were either third-party beneficiaries of the employer insurance policies or 
had an implied contract directly with the insurers.230 Applicable state law re-
quired insurers to pay providers promptly and to pay interest on late pay-
ments.231 The dispute could properly be viewed as either an attempt to assert a 
private right of action under the state law or as a claim to enforce the insured 
employees’ claims as third-party beneficiaries. The court rejected the implied 
right of action claim and the third-party beneficiary claim for similar reasons, 
finding that health care providers were incidental beneficiaries, not intended 
beneficiaries, of the worker’s compensation statute and insurance policies.232 In 
other words, what was missing was a promise, not a bargained-for exchange. 
Turning to the implied-in-fact contract argument, the court reasoned that 
because the insurance companies owed a legal duty to pay benefits promptly, 
any implied promise to pay benefits promptly would not amount to considera-
tion, invoking the pre-existing duty rule.233 The flaw in the analysis, of course, 
 
226  Dittman v. UPMC 154 A.3d 318, 326 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 196 
A.3d 1036, 1056 (Pa. 2018). 
227  Id. 
228  Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1044 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2017). 
229  Id. at 1033. 
230  Id. 
231  Id. 
232  Id. at 1042–43. 
233  Id. at 1044. 
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is that the consideration required to enforce the insurance company’s implied 
promise would flow from the health care providers, not from the insurance 
companies. The health care providers’ claim was that they impliedly promised 
(as required by state law) not to bill the employee or the employer in return for 
the insurers’ promise to pay promptly, and to pay interest on late payments.234 
The providers’ promise to forbear from collecting from workers was the con-
sideration for the insurers’ promise the providers sought to enforce. The true 
flaw in the implied contract argument was not the absence of an exchange of 
promises, it was the absence of any implied promise, because the court consist-
ently found the insurance companies were promising to pay workers and em-
ployers, not medical providers. 
Thus, many judges invoke consideration as requisite for promise enforce-
ment, sometimes misapplying the doctrine, but the results in nearly every case 
can be fully explained without resort to consideration doctrine. 
 
C. Many Cases Invoke and Apply Consideration Doctrine but Did Not Apply 
It (or Misapplied It) 
Looking at the broader set of cases discussing consideration doctrine while 
not denying enforcement, many (twenty-eight) simply recite consideration as 
one of the elements of contract formation, along with offer and acceptance, in 
cases not presenting consideration issues.235 Other cases mention consideration 
in non-contract disputes, including property,236 criminal law237 and local gov-
ernment law cases.238 Many (nineteen) of the cases involve the enforceability of 
covenants not to compete, with rule statements containing some variation of an 
element of valuable or reasonable consideration, along with the other reasona-
bleness elements.239 Apart from the noncompete cases, other employment dis-
putes grappled with whether at-will employment or one-sided mandatory arbi-
tration clauses240 involve illusory promises. These are all fundamentally 
economic exchanges, so courts are discussing “consideration” when the real 
issues are those of public competition policy, unequal bargaining power, eco-
nomic duress, or unfair terms.241 
 
234  Id. 
235  E.g., Mecum v. Weilert Custom Homes, LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 
2017); Bank of Am., NA v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 878 N.W.2d 816, 830 (Mich. 2016). 
236  E.g., Behrens v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 663, 670 (Fed. Cl. 2017). 
237  E.g., State v. Villagomez, 412 P.3d 183, 184 (Or. 2018). 
238  E.g., EP Hotel Partners, LP v. City of El Paso, 527 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2017). 
239  See e.g., Fay v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 799 S.E.2d 318, 323 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017). 
240  E.g., Reed v Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 813, 816 (S.D.W. Va. 2016); Shatteen 
v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp.,113 F. Supp. 3d 176, 178, 180–81 (D.D.C. 2015). 
241  Fay, 799 S.E.2d at 327 (Geathers, J., concurring) (finding employee noncompete agree-
ment invalid as an excessive restraint of trade); Motormax Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Knight, 474 
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 In the following cases, the application of consideration doctrine served no 
useful purpose, or confused the application of other recognized contract law 
rules concerning formation, defenses, or performance and breach. 
Consideration doctrine needlessly confused the issues in a Mississippi 
worker’s compensation dispute.242 The employer sought to avoid payment of 
benefits on the grounds that the purported employee had not been hired yet.243 
The employee was injured during a road test, which was a condition for the of-
fer of a job as truck driver.244 If, as the driver contended, the employer had 
promised him a salary and benefits in return for his attending the road test and 
then beginning work, there was no true consideration problem. The employer’s 
promise to pay salary and benefits (including the legally required worker’s 
compensation) was supported by the employee’s reciprocal promise to drive the 
employer’s trucks.245 The real issue was whether the employer’s invitation to a 
road test was a definite offer subject to a condition, or just an invitation to ap-
ply for a job. The language of the employer’s letter, the court found, left no 
doubt that there was a definite offer, because if the driver passed the test, he 
was hired.246 The court then discussed whether the driver’s participation in the 
road test was a benefit to the employer sufficient to provide consideration for 
the employer’s promise of a job.247 There are two distinct errors in this analy-
sis. First, a benefit to the promisor is not essential to finding consideration; a 
detriment to the promisee will do just as well. Second, a benefit to the promisor 
can come in the form of either present performance, or a promise of future per-
formance. In this case, the employee’s implied acceptance of the job offer (by 
doing the road test) and his promise of future services obviously constituted 
consideration, either as benefit to the employer or detriment to the employee, in 
exchange for promised salary and benefits. The time spent by lawyers briefing, 
and the court deciding, the non-issue of consideration merely added to the 
transaction costs of this case. 
Another example of a confused consideration argument involved an em-
ployer attempting to evade its own promise to hire noncitizen guest workers 
and pay them the legal minimum wage.248 The employer asserted that its legal 
obligation to pay the minimum wage was a pre-existing duty that could not 
 
S.W.3d 164, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (invalidating arbitration clause in auto title loan be-
cause only consumer was bound). 
242  Averitt Exp., Inc. v. Collins, 172 So. 3d 1252, 1254 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). 
243  Id. 
244  Id. at 1254–55. 
245  See id. at 1257. 
246  Id. at 1256. 
247  Id. at 1257. 
248  Cordova v. R&A Oysters, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1290 (S.D. Ala. 2016); Moodie v. 
Kiawah Island Inn Co., LLC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 711, 714 (D.S.C. 2015). 
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amount to consideration.249 This argument (rejected by the court,250 fortunately) 
made no sense. The promise to be enforced was the employer’s; it was there-
fore the employees who furnished the consideration needed to enforce the 
promise, by working, or promising to work. Here, an appellate court was called 
upon to correct the attorneys’ confusion as to whether consideration is some-
thing provided by the promisor or the promisee. 
The promisor/promisee confusion arose in another employment dispute, 
involving employees suing an employer for failure to protect their personal data 
from a data breach.251 The court found there was no implied promise by the 
employer, but also found, weirdly, that the employees’ act of providing person-
al data was not induced by any employer promise to safeguard the data.252 Of 
course, the promise to be enforced was the employer’s, so if there was a con-
sideration issue, it would be whether the promise to safeguard data was induced 
by either the employees’ services generally, or the employees’ act of providing 
personal data specifically.253 The heart of this emerging and important issue is 
whether protection of personal data should be an implied term in every em-
ployment contract, better analyzed either as a public policy issue or a negli-
gence/duty issue. 
Thus, in many instances it would be simpler for courts to address directly 
whether the parties actually offered and accepted an exchange of promises, or 
promises for performances, rather than couching formation analysis in the lan-
guage of consideration and confusing the analysis in the process.254 
D. Cases Describing Material Breach as a “Failure of Consideration” 
Unnecessary confusion also results from using consideration terminology 
to describe rules having nothing to do with contract identification or formation. 
For example, courts will refer to a material breach as a “failure of considera-
tion,” excusing the other party’s performance.255 Other courts may refer to the 
failure of a condition as a violation of the mutuality required for consideration. 
Of course, in these cases the original exchange of promises was fully supported 
by consideration on both sides. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court 
 
249  Cordova, 169 F. Supp. at 1292; see also Moodie, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 727 (rejecting simi-
lar bizarre employer argument that legal duty to pay minimum wage is a pre-existing duty 
vitiating consideration for promise to pay wages). 
250  Cordova, 169 F. Supp. at 1292; see also Moodie, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 727. 
251  Dittman v UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 196 
A.3d 1036, 1056 (Pa. 2018). 
252  Id. at 326. 
253  See id. at 321. 
254  See Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 66 N.E.3d 507, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (hold-
ing that student handbook was not a contract between high school and student and absent 
any student promises there was no consideration); New v. T3 Investments Corp., 55 N.E. 3d 
870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
255  Altercare of Mayfield Vill., Inc. v. Berner, 86 N.E.3d 649, 658 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017); 
KIT Projects, LLC v. PLT P’ship, 479 S.W.3d 519, 527 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015). 
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found that a promise not to sue for breach of a prior contract, given in exchange 
for a promised payment, was not enforceable because timely payment was an 
express condition of the release of the breach of contract claim.256 Although the 
court described this holding as based on the rule that promises must be enforce-
able to constitute consideration, there was obviously no consideration problem 
with the original settlement agreement: the plaintiff promised not to sue and the 
defendant promised to pay a sum of money.257 The reference to mutuality of 
promises, duly coded by West as a consideration holding, was in fact a holding 
based on the rule that the failure of an express condition excuses the reciprocal 
promise. Modern courts would do better to dispense with the reference to con-
sideration when applying the rules of conditions, performance, and breach. 
E. Cases Referring to “Adequacy of Consideration” When Applying 
Unconscionability Analysis, or When Refusing to Judge the Fairness of a 
Bargain 
One set of cases invoke the rule that courts will not judge the adequacy of 
consideration, or in other words, the fairness of the contractual exchange, ex-
cept when a party establishes an accepted enforceability defense, such as fraud, 
unconscionability, or duress.258 In the context of one-sided bargains, considera-
tion doctrine achieves little except to bias courts against applying enforceability 
defenses intended to curb abuses of bargaining power. 
Mandatory arbitration clauses are often challenged as unconscionable or 
violating some public policy, using the language of consideration.259 For exam-
ple, a patient sought to avoid an arbitration clause inserted in an invoice for 
medical records, and to dispute the reasonableness of the medical records pro-
vider’s fee.260 The court found the arbitration clause unenforceable for lack of 
consideration, on the grounds that a statute entitled the patient to obtain the 
records for a “reasonable, cost-based fee” and thus created a pre-existing duty 
that could not constitute consideration for the patient’s promise to arbitrate dis-
putes.261 The court was really saying that the statute’s regulation of the contract 
content not only barred unreasonable fees, but also any other condition or 
promise imposed on the patient.262 In other words, public policy essentially 
barred the inclusion of an arbitration agreement. 
 
256  Cherry v. Pinson Termite & Pest Control, LLC, 206 So. 3d 557, 565–66 (Ala. 2016). 
257  See id. at 560. 
258  159 MP Corp. v Redbridge Bedford, LLC, 71 N.Y.S.3d 87, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018). 
259  See, e.g., Hudson v. BAH Shoney’s Corp., 263 F. Supp. 3d 661, 668–71 (M.D. Tenn. 
2017) (finding restaurant employee’s arbitration agreement unenforceable as not a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of jury trial, although consideration was present). 
260  Bernetich, Hatzell & Pascu, LLC v. Med. Records Online, Inc., 136 A.3d 955, 958 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). 
261  Id. at 959–61. 
262  Id. at 962. 
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Similarly, an employee successfully challenged an arbitration provision in 
an initial employment contract because the employer had the right to unilateral-
ly change all terms of the agreement, rendering the employers’ promises illuso-
ry.263 Here again, the court invoked consideration doctrine to undo an arbitra-
tion agreement, when the true basis for the decision was unconscionability 
(extreme one-sidedness) rather than absence of a bargained-for exchange. 
A federal judge in New Mexico found an employer’s post-employment ar-
bitration program enforceable because the employee’s continued employment 
under new ownership constituted sufficient consideration for the change in em-
ployment terms.264 The court, rather unconvincingly, distinguished New Mexi-
co state court decisions finding that continued at-will employment is not a legal 
detriment to the employer and therefore not sufficient consideration to support 
a post-hiring arbitration clause.265 
Another case in which one suspects the court found a one-sided bargain un-
just, and misapplied consideration doctrine, involved three promoters of a to-
be-formed corporation, one of whom promised to provide all the capital ($1 
million) while the other two promised to perform as managers, with the manag-
ers each receiving 45 percent and the investor receiving 10 percent of the 
shares.266 Clearly, the mutual promises (to allocate shares in the new venture) 
were a form of consideration that each gave the other. Nevertheless, the Illinois 
court found the future managers’ promise illusory, and denied enforcement of 
the investor’s promise of $1 million.267 The real problem with this business 
transaction was not an absence of mutual exchange, but the court’s apparent 
perception that the exchange was extremely lopsided. Unconscionability doc-
trine is better suited to evaluate such claims. 
F. Cases Referring to Presence or Adequacy of Consideration When 
Evaluating the Reasonableness of Covenants Not to Compete as a Matter 
of Public Policy 
 Consideration language appears frequently in employment cases revolving 
around the enforceability of non-compete agreements.268 In these cases the usu-
al issue is either the public policy enforceability defense that disfavors enforc-
ing unreasonable restraints on trade, or a problem of a post-contract modifica-
tion when an employer adds a non-compete agreement to an existing 
 
263  Bowers v. Asbury St. Louis Lex, LLC, 478 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
264  Laurich v. Red Lobster Rests., LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1217–18 (D.N.M. 2017). 
265  Id. at 1217 (citing Piano v. Premier Distrib. Co., 107 P.3d 11, 14 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) 
and Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.N.M. 2001)). 
266  DiCosola v. Ryan, 44 N.E.3d 556, 560–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
267  Id. at 562. 
268  E.g., Horter Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Cutter, 257 F. Supp. 3d 892, 901–02 (S.D. Ohio 2017); 
Socko v. Mid-Atl. Sys. of CPA, Inc., 126 A.3d 1266, 1275 (Pa. 2015); Eurecat U.S., Inc. v. 
Marklund, 527 S.W.3d 367, 387–88 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017). 
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employment contract.269 When courts identify consideration as an element for 
the enforceability of a non-compete agreement as part of an initial employment 
contract, consideration adds nothing to the analysis. The employee gets a prom-
ise of a salary in exchange for services provided and the promise not to com-
pete after termination.270 These are essentially “incantation” cases, when the 
consideration element is superfluous and the real analysis is reasonableness of, 
and hence the willingness of courts to enforce, an agreement in restraint of 
trade. Some courts have held that at-will employment is essentially an illusory 
promise, and therefore fails as consideration for an employee promise not to 
compete.271 The existence or adequacy of consideration is sometimes invoked 
as a test of whether a restrictive covenant should be enforced,272 but what is re-
ally going on in these cases is an evaluation of the reasonableness of a restraint 
of trade. 
When the issue presented is whether to enforce a covenant not to compete 
obtained by an employer after the initial employment contract was made, the 
court is faced with a post-contract modification issue, where consideration doc-
trine masks the real issues.273 Courts are not consistent in treatment of these 
“afterthought agreement” cases.274 For example, when an employee signed a 
modified confidentiality agreement eleven years after his initial employment 
(when he had signed an earlier version of the confidentiality promise) the Texas 
Appeals Court found the modified confidentiality agreement unenforceable for 
lack of consideration.275 The court held that a promise of continued employ-
ment was illusory because the employment was at-will.276 That reasoning, of 
course, would prevent any modification of an ongoing employment contract by 
the employer, regardless of changes in circumstances, at least in the absence of 
a cash payment, salary increase, or other new promise by the employer. An 
Ohio court, on the other hand, found that a promise of continued at-will em-
 
269  See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, Employee Non-Competes and Consideration: 
A Proposed Good Faith Standard for the “Afterthought” Agreement, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 
409, 412–17 (2015). 
270  Some state courts have ruled that at-will employment is consideration for an employee’s 
promise not to compete. Horter Inv. Mgmt., 257 F. Supp. 3d at 902; Metalico Pittsburgh Inc. 
v. Newman, 160 A.3d 205, 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). While others hold that at-will em-
ployment is not consideration. Boswell v Panera Bread Co., 879 F.3d 296, 301 (8th Cir. 
2018) (applying Missouri law). 
271  Boswell, 879 F.3d at 301. 
272  E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gemma, 301 F. Supp. 3d 523, 534 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (apply-
ing Pennsylvania law); Brinton Bus. Ventures, Inc. v. Searle, 248 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1035–36 
(D. Or. 2017) (applying Oregon law); ATC Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. RCM Techs., Inc., 192 
F. Supp. 3d 943, 960 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (applying Illinois law). 
273  See supra text accompanying notes 72–126. 
274  Alph C. Kaufman, Inc. v. Cornerstone Indus. Corp., 540 S.W.3d 803, 814 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2017); Amerigas Propane, LP v. Coffey, No. 14 CVS 376, 2015 WL 6093207, at *9 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2015). 
275  Eurecat U.S., Inc. v. Marklund, 527 S.W.3d 367, 388–89 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017); accord 
Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 584 (5th Cir. 2015). 
276  Eurecat U.S., Inc., 527 S.W.3d at 389. 
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ployment would be consideration for a post-hire non-compete agreement.277 
This area of the law could be made more coherent by abandoning references to 
consideration and instead evaluating issues of economic duress and the reason-
ableness of particular non-compete arrangements, balancing the employee’s 
ability to earn a living with legitimate employer interests. 
The irony of the covenant not to compete cases and the mandatory arbitra-
tion cases is that consideration language is used to do precisely what considera-
tion doctrine eschews, namely to evaluate the fairness of a contractual ex-
change.278 
This survey of contemporary case law confirms the observation that the 
core consideration principle, that a promise not supported by a bargained-for 
exchange is not enforceable, is often recited, often invoked mistakenly when 
other contract rules are at issue, frequently misunderstood or misapplied, and 
does little or no independent work to filter out promises not meriting judicial 
enforcement. 
IV. THE CONSIDERATION-FREE CONTRACTS LAW SYLLABUS 
To begin with, we should abandon the archaic usage of the word “consid-
eration” to refer to the bargained-for exchange, and allow it to join assumpsit, 
chattel mortgage, and trespass on the case in the museum of disused legal 
terms. To teach contemporary contract law, the more familiar terms “bargain 
theory” or “exchange theory” will serve just as well. Legal historians may wish 
to recount the origins of the term “consideration” in the common law and the 
writings of Holmes, Williston and Langdell, perhaps comparing it with its civil 
law cousin “causa.”279 
More importantly, the syllabus should be organized around the most com-
mon problems contract rules must solve. The problem of donative promises 
does not merit the central role that the traditional syllabus allots it. Let us bid 
farewell to Hamer v. Sidway280 and Dougherty v Salt.281 The need to discuss 
bargain theory, in conjunction with reliance and other alternatives, will arise at 
various points throughout the syllabus, and may be taken up in the context of 
each discrete contracting problem. For example, non-exchange promises (dona-
tive promises, promises recognizing past benefits, and reaffirmations) may be 
covered as a group to introduce reliance and restitution. Bargain theory, reli-
 
277  Horter Inv. Mgmt,. LLC v. Cutter, 257 F. Supp. 3d 892, 901–02 (S.D. Ohio 2017). 
278  See Moezinia v. Ashkenazi, 26 N.Y.S.3d 192, 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (noting that 
courts do not inquire into the adequacy or fairness of consideration exchanged). 
279  Kevin J. Fandl, Cross-Border Commercial Contracts and Consideration, 34 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 1, 11 (2016); see generally GILMORE, supra note 1. 
280  Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891) (holding uncle’s promise of money en-
forceable based on the consideration of nephew’s promise to refrain from drinking, smoking, 
swearing or gambling). 
281  Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94–95 (N.Y. 1919) (holding aunt’s written promissory 
note to nephew unenforceable for want of consideration). 
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ance, and restitution will be discussed in presenting the alternative theories of 
remedies; indeed, this is an argument for beginning the contracts syllabus with 
remedies. 
Contracts law professors commonly use one of two structures for their syl-
labi, with, of course, many variations. Some begin with contract remedies, then 
follow with the topics of formation, defenses, interpretation, performance, and 
breach. Others begin with contract formation, and save remedies for the end, 
following a chronological sequence in the life of a contract dispute. The core of 
bargain theory, consideration, is usually covered as part of the contract for-
mation topic, along with offer and acceptance, and perhaps capacity. The con-
sideration corollaries are sometimes included in the formation chapter, and 
sometimes covered later, particularly in the case of the pre-existing duty rule 
and contract modifications. 
It is also customary to present consideration doctrine in three steps.282 First, 
casebooks present a case applying the “traditional” consideration-based rule.283 
Students will then read a contrasting case either rejecting consideration or ap-
plying some exception284. Finally, the Restatement or U.C.C. approach to the 
issue will be presented.285 Students are then left wondering what the “rule” ac-
tually is. 
I advocate a simpler approach. The contract formation topic, whether at the 
beginning of the syllabus or after remedies, ought to cover the rules for discern-
ing a sufficiently definite offer and a timely and clear acceptance. The for-
mation topic may also include the need for a writing under the statute of frauds. 
Once that is accomplished, the professor may consider the exceptional question 
of unenforceable promises: are there any clear promises, although properly and 
timely accepted, that the law nevertheless ought not to enforce? In lieu of “con-
sideration” as the answer to the question, the professor (and casebook) may 
cover the alternative and complementary bases for enforcing promises: the bar-
gained-for exchange, the promise recognizing past obligations, or promises in-
ducing reasonable and foreseeable reliance. This is essentially what Restate-
ment (Second) section 17(2) instructs. Neither the case law nor contemporary 
theory would justify giving primacy to the bargained-for exchange. The topic 
of restitution may usefully be presented at this point. 
After presenting examples of promises enforced on each of these three ba-
ses, the class might take a brief detour to consider examples of unserious or 
otherwise unreasonable-to-rely-on promises that courts have properly refused 
to enforce.286 These examples are sufficiently rare that one need not detain the 
 
282  Maggs, supra note 114, at 508 (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1995)). 
283  Id. 
284  Id. 
285  Id. 
286  The classics of the genre include Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 132 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 210 F.3d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2000), and Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 
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class too long for this discussion of the outer limits of contract. Most useful ex-
amples are cases in which the promise was insufficiently serious or definite, so 
that courts could just as well have relied on offer and acceptance rules to deny 
enforcement.287 The issue of enforcing donative promises, including charitable 
subscriptions, merits fuller discussion; it should include formality, reliance, and 
the bargained-for exchange as alternative rules, and describe the present state of 
the law as looking primarily to reliance as the touchstone for enforcement.288 
As for the doctrinal corollaries to consideration, each can be taken up at the 
appropriate point in the syllabus. The revocability of firm offers is an issue 
about the termination of offers, appropriately discussed under the rubric of of-
fer and acceptance. Modification can be discussed with other post-formation 
issues, including impracticability, waiver, and breach. So-called illusory prom-
ises and absence of mutuality fit better in discussions of the duty of good faith, 
unconscionability, and other enforceability defenses. Third-party guarantees are 
a separate topic, perhaps to accompany assignment, delegation, and third-party 
beneficiaries, if those are even covered in a basic contract law class. 
Certainly, a conscientious professor ought to acknowledge the persistence 
of historical consideration doctrine in court decisions, when taking up each of 
these discrete problems. But one ought also to give prominent place to the 
modern trend, reflected in the Restatement (Second) and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, which is to replace consideration doctrine, or at least to riddle it with 
exceptions, at the formation stage and with respect to each of the corollaries. 
For each problem, the three steps289 ought to be reversed, presenting first the 
modern approach taken by the Restatement (Second) and the U.C.C., followed 
by cases adopting the modern approach, and relegating to the third step cases 
stubbornly adhering to the historical consideration approach. 
So, for example, the law of contract modification requires the professor to 
confront the divided case law. However, there is no reason to begin with the old 
“pre-existing duty” rule, nor does it make any sense to teach contract modifica-
tion in a chapter on initial contract formation. One could, and I would argue 
ought to, begin by presenting the problem, with an old case like Alaska Pack-
ers290 or a contemporary case like Angel v. Murray.291 If the U.C.C. and Re-
statement approaches are the modern and better trend, teach those first. Case-
books often present two cases to illustrate two opposing rules to resolve an 
issue. The pre-existing duty rule can be explained as a relic of classic contract 
 
522 (Va. 1954). For a recent case, see Willey v. Willey, 385 P.3d 290, 301 (Wyo. 2016) (fa-
ther’s promise to leave son the family ranch too indefinite and not relied upon). 
287  E.g., Willey, 385 P.3d at 301. 
288  See supra text accompanying notes 50–58. 
289  See Maggs, supra note 114, at 509. 
290  Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902) (refusing to enforce 
employer’s promise to increase wages originally promised to sailors, for want of considera-
tion). 
291  Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 636, 638 (R.I. 1974) (adopting Restatement section 89 
and enforcing a contract modification based on changed circumstances). 
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theory, which attempts but fails to protect contracting parties from economic 
duress or abuse of leverage in the contract relationship. 
Leading casebooks take a variety of approaches to the pre-existing duty 
rule and modifications.292 Professor Calamari includes the topic in a second 
chapter devoted to consideration, following the first chapter on offer and ac-
ceptance.293 A case relying on the pre-existing duty rule is followed by Angel v. 
Murray, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decision adopting Restatement sec-
tion 89.294 Professor Barnett also includes modification cases in a chapter on 
consideration, but notes that the pre-existing duty rule has been heavily criti-
cized, and abandoned by the U.C.C.295 Professor Ayres similarly includes con-
tract modifications in the formation chapter on consideration, while also noting 
that the traditional rule is one of the most criticized in the common law.296 Pro-
fessor Farnsworth and colleagues, who appear to take a more skeptical view of 
the pre-existing duty rule, cover it in a chapter on duress as an enforceability 
defense.297 Professor Knapp and colleagues discuss modification in a chapter 
on excuses for nonperformance, including mistake, impracticability and modi-
fication, telling the student that consideration is one of a number of doctrines 
that may be brought to bear on the post-contract modification problem.298 
These latter two are clearly better approaches. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of consideration and its corollaries are outmoded rules whose 
persistence in the classroom and the courtroom have long ago outlived their 
usefulness in resolving a discrete set of contract problems. Each of these prob-
lems, the charitable pledge or donative promise, the post-contract modification, 
the firm offer, the illusory promise, the promise to compensate past services 
and the third-party guarantee, deserves its separate place in the contracts class 
syllabus. Each can be presented as a problem with different legal solutions that 
may advance values of autonomy, utilitarian wealth maximization, moral obli-
gation or equity. Each problem can be shown to have a historic and formalistic 
rule derived from bargain theory and a number of modern alternatives. In the 
fifty years that have elapsed since the Second Restatement, consideration doc-
trine has lost its descriptive and normative powers, and as this survey of con-
temporary cases shows, confused new generations of lawyers and judges. The 
time has come to retire this doctrinal relic in our teaching of contracts law. 
 
292  See Maggs, supra note 114, at 509. 
293  JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 194 (6th ed. 2011). 
294  Id. at 196–97. 
295  RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 634, 647 (3d ed. 2003). 
296  IAN AYRES ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 110 (8th ed. 2012). 
297  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 359–71 (8th ed. 
2013). 
298  CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 701 
(8th ed. 2016). 
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